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Analysis of How Mobile Robots Fail in the Field
Jennifer Carlson
ABSTRACT
The considerable risk to human life associated with modern military operations in urban
terrain (MOUT) and urban search and rescue (USAR) has led professionals in these
domains to explore the use of robots to improve safety. Recent studies on mobile robot use
in the field have shown a noticeable lack of reliability in real field conditions. Improving
mobile robot reliability for applications such as USAR and MOUT requires an
understanding of how mobile robots fail in field environments.
This paper provides a detailed investigation of how ground-based mobile robots
fail in the field. Forty-four representative examples of failures from 13 studies of mobile
robot reliability in the USAR and MOUT domains are gathered, examined, and classified.
A novel taxonomy sufficient to cover any failure a ground-based mobile robot may
encounter in the field is presented. This classification scheme draws from established
standards in the dependability computing [30] and human-computer interaction [40]
communities, as well as recent work [6] in the robotics domain. Both physical failures
(failures within the robotic system) and human failures are considered.
Overall robot reliability in field environments is low with between 6 and 20 hours
mean time between failures (MTBF), depending on the criteria used to determine if a
failure has occurred. Common issues with existing platforms appear to be the following:
unstable control systems, chassis and effectors designed and tested for a narrow range of
environmental conditions, limited wireless communication range in urban environments,
vii
and insufficient wireless bandwidth. Effectors and the control system are the most
common sources of physical failures. Of the human failures examined, slips are more
common than mistakes. Two-thirds of the failures examined in [6] and [7] could be
repaired in the field. Failures which resulted in the suspension of the robot’s task until the
repair was completed are also more common with 94% of the failures reported in [13].
viii
Chapter One
Introduction
This thesis provides a detailed investigation of how ground-based mobile robots fail in the
field. Forty-four representative examples of failures from 13 studies of mobile robot
reliability in the Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and Military Operations in Urban
Terrain (MOUT) domains are gathered, classified, and examined. A novel taxonomy is
presented and used which draws from the dependability computing [30], human-computer
interaction [40], and robotics [6] communities and is sufficient to cover any failure a
ground-based mobile robot may encounter in the field. Both physical failures (failures
within the robotic system) and human failures are considered.
The 13 studies come from two primary sources. The Center for Robot-Assisted
Search and Rescue (CRASAR) at the University of South Florida provided five of the
studies. CRASAR spends more than 200 hours per year using the robots in the field and
currently has twenty-one robots from six manufacturers. The other eight come from the
Test and Evaluation Coordination Office (TECO), part of the Maneuver Support Center at
Fort Leonard Wood. TECO provides operational test and evaluation expertise to the
Chemical, Engineer and Military Police Schools and assists in the development and
execution of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) for the US Army.
Overall robot reliability in field environments is low with between 6 and 20 hours
mean time between failures (MTBF), depending on the criteria used to determine if a
failure has occurred. Common issues with existing platforms appear to be the following:
unstable control systems, chassis and effectors designed and tested for a narrow range of
1
environmental conditions, limited wireless communication range in urban environments,
and insufficient wireless bandwidth. Effectors and the control system are the most
common sources of physical failures. Of the human failures examined, slips are more
common than mistakes. Two-thirds of the failures examined in CRASAR’s reliability
studies [6][7] could be repaired in the field. Failures which resulted in the suspension of
the robot’s task until the repair was completed are also more common with 94% of the
failures reported in TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13].
1.1 Motivation
The considerable risk to human life associated with modern MOUT and USAR has led
professionals in each of these domains to explore the use of advanced technology, like
robotics, to improve safety. Mobile robots are appealing for USAR and the military
because they can be sent either ahead of or in place of humans in particularly hazardous
situations. They are also capable of doing things humans cannot, like enduring low
oxygen environments (without support equipment) and working for indefinitely long shifts
without becoming fatigued (if provided sufficient power). Mobile robots can send back a
wide variety of data from their on-board sensors. Despite the lure of these features, only a
few mobile robots have been used in real USAR (e.g. the World Trade Center rescue
response [34][8]) and military operations (such as cave reconnaissance in
Afghanistan [2]). The final acceptance of robot technology in these new application areas
will depend as much on their reliability, as on the capabilities of the robot platform (such
as the ability to detect chemical or biological agents). A fragile robot in constant need of
maintenance and repair is likely to be left behind to make room for more reliable
equipment.
There are a variety of factors which make field work particularly challenging for
robots as opposed to lab conditions. For example, conditions which a robot may
2
Figure 1. An Inuktun MicroVGTV Inside a Confined Space Training Maze.
Figure 2. An iRobot Packbot Climbing a Rubble Pile Used for USAR Training.
encounter in a field environment for USAR and/or MOUT include: dirt, standing water,
rain, intense heat, intense cold, confined spaces (see Figure 1), uneven surfaces (see
Figure 2), the presence of obstacles with unpredictable movement, and hostile agents.
Recent studies on mobile robot use in the field have shown a noticeable lack of
reliability in real field conditions. In [6] the mean time between failures (MTBF) for field
robots was a little over 6 hours and the availability rate was only 50%. The analysis
in [34] showed that tethered robots required assistance through the tether an average of 2.8
times per minute. Studies performed by TECO have found a MTBF less than 20 hours.
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Improving mobile robot reliability for applications such as USAR and MOUT requires an
understanding of how mobile robots fail in field environments.
1.2 Research Question
How do ground-based mobile robots fail in the field?
Understanding mobile robot field failures requires knowledge of the causes of
failures and their characteristics. These characteristics include the frequency, symptoms,
and impact of each type of failure. It is also important to know how the robots’ operating
environment, and decisions made during their design affect these characteristics. A wide
variety of platforms must be examined to isolate traits of failures that span all
ground-based mobile robots which could be used in the field. The organizations which
operate in hazardous domains, like USAR, rely heavily on interaction [9]. Even a fully
autonomous mobile robot must still interact with and take orders from humans [37].
Therefore, not only the failures of the robot platform but also human operator errors must
be considered when examining mobile robot reliability in these domains.
1.3 Contribution
This work provides two major contributions:
1. A taxonomy of robot failures built from a synthesis of failure taxonomies in three
separate communities within the field of Computer Science.
2. A meta-study including 44 representative examples of mobile robot field failures
drawn from 13 studies in the USAR and MOUT domains, arguably two of the most
challenging field domains for ground-based mobile robots. These examples
demonstrate how mobile robot failures can be classified using the new taxonomy
and the challenges associated with using robots in field environments.
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The taxonomy was created from experience in the robotics [6], human-computer
interaction [40] and dependability computing [30] communities. Failures are categorized
based on the source of failure (physical and human). Two attributes, repairability and
impact, are used to capture the severity and repercussions of the physical failures. Though
the taxonomy was designed to cover only field failures, it is expected to be sufficient to
cover any application of mobile robots.
Information on how and when mobile robots fail helps to identify the weaknesses
of current mobile robot technology, which in turn, illuminates the challenges which robot
manufacturers and developers of fault-tolerant control systems must meet to improve their
reliability. In addition, potential adopters of mobile robot technology can benefit from an
unbiased, quantitative assessment of current technology. This gives them the ability to
balance the capabilities a mobile robot will bring to their application domain against the
actual cost of maintaining the equipment.
Data on how mobile robots fail can also be used to provide a realistic starting point
for fault modeling in model-based fault tolerance systems, such as [25], [32], [48], [51],
[54], and [61]. In addition, robot fault-tolerance approaches which use costly diagnosis
techniques, like active probing (gathering additional information from other sensors or
robots) used by Long and Murphy [31], would also benefit from the incorporation of
probability data to rank hypotheses, reducing the cost of diagnosis by ensuring that the
most likely hypotheses are checked first.
1.4 Overview of Analysis Method
This thesis examines mobile robot failure data from 13 studies from the Center for
Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue (CRASAR) at the University of South Florida and the
Test and Evaluation Coordination Office at Fort Leonard Wood [42]. These include the
CRASAR’s World Trade Center (WTC) studies [34][8], field experiments with
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Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department [10], and reliability analyses [6][7]; as well
as TECO’s eight mobile robot studies described in [42]. A total of 28 robots were
considered in this thesis, representing 15 different models from seven manufacturers.
They range from small (less than 10 pounds) tracked vehicles capable of changing their
geometry, to a modified M1 tank (over 60 tons).
For the purposes of this paper, a field environment is defined as an environment
which has not been modified to ensure the safety of the robot or to enhance its
performance, and a failure is the inability of the robot or its support equipment to function
normally. Note that both complete breakdowns and noticeable degradations are included.
As discussed in Section 1.3 a novel taxonomy of mobile robot failures was
developed for this meta-study. The taxonomy shown in Figure 3 uses classes to capture
the source of the failure which can be either physical (system or robot) or human. Five
subclasses, based on common subsystems found in all robot systems, fall within the
physical branch. These are effector, sensor, control system, power, and communications.
Human failures are divided into design and interaction subclasses, the latter of which is
further subdivided into mistakes and slips. Two attributes are also included to describe the
severity of the physical failures in terms of its repairability and impact on the robot’s
mission at the time of the failure. The values given to these attributes are field-repairable
and non-field-repairable, and terminal and non-terminal respectively.
Due to differences in data collection and reporting methods among the studies,
quantitative analysis of the failure data was often not possible. Therefore, the majority of
the findings are based on examination of the examples of field failures described in each
of the studies. Where quantitative results could be generated, standard formulas taken
from [24] were used to convert the data into common reliability metrics. One such metric
was the mean time between failures (MTBF), which provides a rough estimate of how
long one can expect to use a robot without encountering failures. Projected availability,
6
Figure 3. The Taxonomy of Mobile Robot Failures Used in this Analysis. Classes are
shown with solid lines, and attributes with dashed lines.
also called reliability, was also used. This metric is reported as a percentage and should be
interpreted as the probability that the robot will be free of failures at a particular point in
time. All other quantitative results, such as the average downtime and probability that a
failure was caused by a component in class (from the taxonomy) c, were also calculated
using standard formulas.
1.5 Thesis Organization
Chapter Two provides an overview of related work in robot reliability, failure and
reliability analysis approaches, and fault tolerant systems, establishing the uniqueness and
potential benefits of a detailed study on how mobile robots fail in the field within the
larger robotics community. Chapter Three describes the new method for examining
mobile robot failures used in this meta-study including some basic criteria, a novel
taxonomy developed for mobile robot failures, and formulas used to summarize the failure
data in terms of reliability metrics. In Chapter Four, the 13 studies included in this
meta-study are described in detail, including the robots examined, the information
available from each study, their approach to failure documentation and analysis, and a
summary of important results. Chapter Five presents 44 representative examples of mobile
7
robot field failures from the 13 studies, and any numeric results available. Its organization
follows the new taxonomy exactly, providing an example of how the taxonomy can be
used to classify failure events and, in turn, using those examples to highlight the
characteristics of failures which fall into each class. Finally, in Chapter Six, a summary of
the findings of this meta-study is given followed by a discussion of the implications of
these findings and recommended avenues for improvement. Chapter Six closes with an
overview of future work on this topic.
8
Chapter Two
Related Literature
This chapter provides an overview of related work in robot reliability, failure and
reliability analysis approaches, and fault tolerant systems. It establishes both the
uniqueness and potential benefits of a detailed study on how mobile robots fail in the field
within the larger robotics community. Section 2.1 compares related work on robot failure
analysis and reliability. Section 2.2 examines approaches to failure and reliability analysis
found in the literature, looking for suitable techniques for a meta-study of mobile robot
field failures. Section 2.3 presents relevant work in fault-tolerance systems for mobile
robots. Finally, Section 2.4 provides a summary of the results of this literature review.
Section 2.1 presents studies found in the literature which attempt to characterize
and improve robot reliability, excluding the 13 studies included in this meta-study. This
includes studies which seek to improve robot reliability through failure and reliability
analyses, as well as qualitative studies of mobile robot suitability. It is shown that this
thesis is unique in three respects: both human and robot failures are examined, it covers
robot failures in the urban search and rescue (USAR) and military operations in urban
terrain (MOUT) domains, and it is the only meta-study that covers mobile robot failures.
Section 2.2 covers two distinct approaches to failure and reliability analysis found
in the literature: characterization and formal validation. Characterization approaches from
the dependability computing, human-computer interaction, and robotics communities are
presented. These classify failures based on a pre-defined set of categories. Formal
validation approaches from the robotics and control theoretic literature are also included.
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These create a complete model of the system to be studied and then examine that model to
determine if it meets reliability criteria. This section establishes that no existing approach
is suitable for the task of mobile robot field failure analysis. The classification schemes
developed for dependability computing and HCI are not sufficient, and formal validation
methods can only be applied to a single system (e.g. robot model) and/or a single task at a
time. This establishes the need for a new method of robot failure analysis. This thesis
contributes such a method that is described in detail in Chapter Three.
Failures appear most often in the robotics literature in studies which endeavor to
create fault-tolerance systems that can detect, isolate, and/or recover from failures.
Fault-tolerance work, presented in Section 2.3, is of interest to this meta-study for two
reasons. First, a fault-tolerance system is created for failures with certain characteristics.
It is of interest to see if the community as a whole agrees on common characteristics of
robot failures. Second, fault-tolerance researchers and developers are a potential consumer
of the results of this study.
This section reveals that, while none of the studies discussed presented any
evidence of having investigated the kinds of failures robots encounter, each approach
made certain assumptions about the characteristics of those failures. It is concluded that
the fault-tolerance community can benefit from this meta-study, which provides
information on common failures for field domains like USAR and MOUT. Fault-tolerance
systems which use probabilistic modeling, in particular, can use the frequency of failures
and relative probability of failure for robot subsystems presented in Chapter Five as
high-fidelity estimates for USAR and MOUT environments.
2.1 Robot Failure and Qualitative Evaluation Studies
This section covers studies which are related to this meta-study by having similar goals,
namely to characterize and improve robot reliability. Specifically, Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2
10
cover studies that seek to improve robot reliability through failure and reliability analyses
respectively. In Section 2.1.3 qualitative studies of mobile robot suitability for the USAR
domain are presented. The studies covered in this section are not included in the
meta-study for one of two reasons: they study robots used in indoor, controlled
environments; or they present shortcomings of mobile robots for USAR based on the
characteristics of the domain, rather than the examination of documented failures.
2.1.1 Multiple Data Source Robotic Manipulator Failure Analyses
Two studies were found in the literature that, like this meta-study, examined robot failures
from multiple sources. Both covered industrial manipulators used primarily in the
automotive industry. Beauchamp and Stobbe [1] examined documented human-robot
system accidents from nine different studies. Starr, Wynne, and Kennedy [52] surveyed
failure and maintenance reports from two large automotive plants.
In [1] Beauchamp and Stobbe present a review of human factors1 experimental
studies on human-robot system accidents, where the robot is an automated industrial
manipulator. The review included two types of studies: studies of documented
human-robot system accidents (nine summarized), and related human-factors experiments
(11 included). The focus of the paper was the latter. The review of the human-robot
accident studies served mainly as motivation for additional work in human-factors on
industrial manipulator systems. The findings of each of the nine studies were summarized
individually. No classification scheme was developed to describe the documented
accidents. Neither the rate of failure nor the impact of the failures (on the human involved
or plant productivity) was determined. A quick summary of the accident studies provided
the following overall findings: most accidents occur during programming (training the
1Human factors is a field of study involving research into human psychological, social, physical, and
biological characteristics, and working to apply that information to the design, operation, and use of products
or systems to optimize human performance and safety.
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manipulator to perform a task) and/or maintenance, when a person is likely to be found
within the operating envelope (area in which the robot’s arm could move) of the
manipulator; and the accidents frequently involved unexpected robot movement which
was caused by either equipment failure (maintenance) or human error (programming).
Starr, et al. present in [52] a survey of the failures of robotic industrial
manipulators. The survey includes failure and maintenance reports from two automotive
plants. The data covered 200 robots from five manufacturers over a period of 21 weeks for
Plant A and 5 weeks for Plant B. In Plant A, the robots were found to be down for repair
or maintenance for 3.95 hours per week per manufacturing line, and in Plant B, the
downtime rate was 1.74 hours. Robot usage was not recorded, therefore the mean-time
between failures could not be determined. The analysis created eight categories to
summarize the 60 and 100 different codes (used to indicate the type of failure) used in
Plant A and Plant B, respectively. Non-robot failures (80% of all failures encountered)
were placed in their own category and were not analyzed further. Of the robot failures,
position failures were the most common at 45%, followed by drive system (hardware)
failures at 25%. The data from Plant B were also analyzed in groups by manufacturer. The
differences in the results for each manufacturer were determined to be due to differences
in the manipulators’ tasks (spot welding versus transportation) and drive system (electrical
versus hydraulic). For example, the hydraulic robots had double the number of failures
recorded per manufacturing line compared to the electric robots.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the differences between the two studies
covered in this section and this meta-study. Table 1 lists the type of robot, type of failures
(robot or human), and the method used to synthesize the data for further analysis. Table 2
provides additional information for comparison in terms of the number of robots and the
failure attributes examined. These tables show that this meta-study covers mobile robot
failures in a more complete (including both human and robots failures) and organized
12
Table 1. Comparison of Related Studies Including Synthesis Method, and Robot and Fail-
ure Types. Manipulators refers to automated industrial manipulators.
Study Robot Type Failure Type Synthesis Method
Beauchamp
and Stobbe[1]
Manipulators Human only None
Starr et al.[52] Manipulators Robot only Classified using categories
developed for this analysis
This meta-
study
Mobile robots Human and Robot
Field Failures
Classified using a complete
failure taxonomy
Table 2. Comparison of Related Studies: Number of Robots and Failure Attributes Exam-
ined.
Failure Attributes Examined
Study # Robots Frequency Impact Relative Frequency
of Categories
Beauchamp
and Stobbe[1]
Unknown No No No
Starr et al.[52] 200 from 5 manu. No Yes Yes
This meta-
study
28 from 7 manu. Yes Yes Yes
fashion than the two studies of industrial manipulator failures. Table 2 also shows that
Starr et al.’s study is larger in scope in terms of the number of robots examined. This is
due to the fact that industrial manipulators have been accepted as essential tools in the
automotive industry. No such industry exists today for mobile robots.
2.1.2 Single Data Source Mobile Robot Reliability Studies
The Workshop on Robots in Exhibitions at IROS2 in September of 2002 produced two
studies on the reliability of mobile robots actively used for long periods of time.
Nourbakhsh [41] describes a set of four autonomous robots used for a period of five years
as full-time museum docents. Their robots reached a mean time between failures (MTBF)
2IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems
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of 72 to 216 hours. Tomatis, Terrien, Piguet, Burnier, Bouabdallah, and Siegwart in [58]
describe a similar project. As compared to the scope of this meta-study, the analysis
described by Tomatis et.al. was more narrow both in the applications and the robots
analyzed. The operating environment was also indoors and engineered to assist the robot.
However, their MTBF was 7 hours — similar to the 8.3 hour MTBF found in the original
reliability study [6] performed by the Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue
(CRASAR).
2.1.3 Qualitative Evaluation of Mobile Robots for USAR
Three studies have concentrated on identifying the weaknesses of ground-based mobile
robots for USAR based solely on the characteristics of the robot and the constraints of the
domain. Blitch provides a survey in [2] of the mobility problems keeping current robot
technology from populating well-suited niches within USAR, especially the confined
space access niche. Tumble recovery, traction, and the (incorrect) assumption of an
obstacle-free working envelope are identified as the key problems. Casper, Micire, and
Murphy [9] present an overview of the USAR domain, listing tasks that robots are best
suited for, followed by a discussion of the constraints that application domain places on
robotic technology. Sensors are identified as the area which requires the most
improvement, though weather-proofing and an invertible chassis were also mentioned as
required features rarely found in robots at that time. In [37] Murphy, Casper, Hyams,
Micire, and Minten discuss the same issues as Casper et al. [9] but provide some
additional discussion on the need for adjustable autonomy, or the ability to change the
allocation of control between the robot and its operator.
Table 3 provides a summary of the papers discussed in this section, including this
meta-study, for comparison. The types of robots analyzed, the variety of models, the target
environment or application domain, the kinds of failures (human or robot) examined, and
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Table 3. Comparison of Robot Failure and Qualitative Evaluation Studies. For the meta-
studies, the number of data sources is indicated in parentheses after the group name.
Group Robots Models Environment Failures Analysis
This meta-study
(13)
Mobile
robots
Varied USAR & MOUT Human
and Robot
Failure
Multiple-source
Studies[1][52]
(13 total)
Industrial
Manipulators
Varied Factory Human or
Robot
Failure
Single-source
Studies[41][58]
Mobile
robots
Single Museum Robot Reliability
Qualitative
Evaluation
[2][9][37]
Mobile
robots
Varied USAR Robot Suitability
the analysis type are included. Table 3 shows that this meta-study is unique in that it
covers both human and robot failures, it is focused on robot field failures in the USAR and
military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) domains, and it is the only meta-study that
covers mobile robot failures.
2.2 Failure Analysis Approaches
This section covers the two distinct approaches to failure and reliability analysis found in
the literature: characterization and formal validation. Characterization approaches
(Section 2.2.1) group or classify documented failures based on a pre-defined set of
categories, usually examining the set of failures as a whole and each group individually.
Formal validation approaches (Section 2.2.2) create a model of the system to be studied
and then examine that model to determine if it meets reliability criteria. Formal validation
approaches are useful for analysis of a single specified task which can be explicitly
modeled. For characterization approaches the generality of the categories is the only limit
to the kinds of failures that can be examined in a single study. This meta-study deals with
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mobile robots used in a wide variety of environments for a wide variety of tasks, which is
why this study employs a characterization approach.
2.2.1 Failure Characterization and Classification
This section presents existing classification schemes of failures which were developed for
the dependability computing, robotics, and human-computer interaction (HCI)
communities. In most failure analyses, like Starr et al.[52], the categories used for
classification were developed through examination of the common attributes of the set of
failures to be examined. These classification schemes tend to be limited to the scope of the
set of failures, and the results of such analyses are difficult to apply to other applications
or domains. Therefore this subsection only includes relevant failure classification schemes
created for an entire class of failures, such as human-computer interaction failures, rather
than those created for a specific failure analysis.
In 1984, Laprie [30] and his colleagues developed a set of concepts and definitions
related to the dependability of computer-based systems. According to Laprie a fault is
simply a cause, an error is a state, and a failure is an event. Specifically, a failure is
defined as a deviation from the specified service as seen by the client. The client may be a
human user or another component of the computer system that is trying to use the service.
An error is a state within the system which can lead to a failure. A fault is anything which
could cause the system to enter an error state. Laprie defines two major fault classes,
namely physical faults and human-made faults. Human-made faults are further subdivided
into design faults and interaction faults. [30] defines two levels for severity for failures.
The consequences of benign failures are comparable to the benefits of the service they are
preventing. Malign or catastrophic failures have a higher cost by one or more orders of
magnitude than the service.
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Laprie’s dependability taxonomy is general enough that it can be applied to a large
variety of systems and application domains. Unfortunately, it is not detailed enough for
analyzing mobile robot reliability in the field. For example, a mobile robot can suffer from
an infinite variety of physical faults. Laprie’s levels of severity are also difficult to apply
since the benefit of a service and the cost of a failure tend to vary widely based on the
situation, that is a military training exercise versus a real engagement. Nevertheless, it
provides a solid foundation, so the taxonomy used in this paper (see Section 3.2) draws a
great deal from [30].
In [28] Kokkinaki and Valavanis present the error specification used in their
reliability validation approach for computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) systems.
Their specification is interesting in that it is similar to Laprie’s. Faults and errors have
roughly the same definitions and [28] states that faults may be caused by a physical defect,
the environment, or an operator though no explicit taxonomy of causes is created. Faults
are classified temporally as permanent which exist until repaired, transient which
disappear on their own, and intermittent which repeatedly appear. Errors are classified
based on their scope of influence: null-point errors do not affect the system, single-point
errors are localized to a single agent (task) within the system, and multiple-point errors
affect more than one agent. A failure is defined as an error that spans one or more agents
in the current plan (set of tasks the machine is currently executing). A failure is
recoverable if the system can complete the plan in spite of the failure, irrecoverable if it
cannot, and catastrophic if all agents are effected by the error.
In previous work by Carlson and Murphy [6] a classification scheme was used to
examine failures encountered during day-to-day use of mobile robots in lab, office, and
USAR environments. A failure was defined as the inability of the robot or the equipment
used with the robot to function normally. Categories were defined to capture the source of
the failure based on the common subsystems of a mobile robot: effector (a.k.a. actuator),
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sensor, control system, power, and communications. Two attributes were used to capture
the severity of the failures in terms of repairability, field-repairable versus
non-field-repairable, and its impact on the robot’s mission, terminal versus non-terminal.
This scheme was first verified through interviews with experienced robot operators and
hardware specialists. The latter were graduate students with extensive experience
maintaining and repairing robot platforms. The scheme was then validated through its
application on a wide range of failures recorded over a two year period.
In [40] Norman draws from cognitive psychology, pointing out the weaknesses
and strengths of the subconscious and conscious minds. In [40] he discusses the types and
sources of human error, classifying them as slips (errors in execution of a selected action)
and mistakes (errors in selection of the appropriate action). This classification scheme has
been widely accepted by the HCI community.
2.2.2 Reliability Validation Methods
Formal validation methods have been developed for a wide variety of applications relevant
to mobile robotics: software, industrial manipulators, computer-integrated manufacturing
(CIM) systems, and autonomous systems in general. Some examples include the
automata-based validation approach for CIM systems presented by Kokkinaki and
Valavanis in [28]; and probability-based approaches presented by Sheldon, Mei, and Yang
in [49] and Tchangani in [54].
Petri nets appear to be a preferred tool for validation. In [45] Ramaswamy and
Valavanis present a hierarchical time-extended petri net designed to both analyze and
provide fault identification and recovery capabilities for discrete event dynamic (DED)
systems. Gonza´lez, Mediavilla, Fraile, Gayubo, Turiel, and Garcı´a defined in [20] a petri
net model of a multi-manipulator system in which three manipulators work together
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within the same area (cell) to cooperate on a task. The effect of soft and hard failures, and
periodic maintenance are examined in terms of throughput of the system.
Simmons, Pecheur, and Srinivasan [50] present the use of Symbolic Model
Checking to verify autonomous systems. The main goal of [50] was to create translators
which accept source code for an autonomous system, and convert it to SMV (a specific
Symbolic Model Checking system) specifications. Two target languages, and
subsequently applications, were tested: the Model-based Processing Language (MPL)
used to build Livingstone, the model-based fault diagnosis and recovery system used on
Deep Space One (DS1); and the Task Description Language (TDL), an extension of C++
designed to implement the management layer (task decomposition, synchronization,
monitoring, and exception handling) of autonomous mobile robot systems.
Tables 4 and 5 provide a summary of the failure and reliability analysis approaches
presented in this section. Table 4 gives the target application of the analysis approach, the
applicability (scope) of the results of an analysis which uses the approach, and the types of
failures covered. Table 5 presents the strengths and weaknesses of each approach in the
context of studying how mobile robots fail in the field. These tables show that no existing
approach to failure analysis is suitable for this task. The classification schemes developed
for dependability computing and HCI are complete for their respective areas, but are not
sufficient for categorizing mobile robot failures in the field. Formal validation methods are
restricted to systems and applications which can be described using their modeling
technique (petri nets, Baysian networks, etc.), and can only be applied to a single system
(e.g. robot model) and/or task at a time. A study of mobile robot reliability for USAR and
MOUT applications in general simply cannot be completed using these methods.
Therefore, the strategy taken in this meta-study, and described in detail in Chapter Three,
is a characterization approach which defines its own novel taxonomy drawn from the
classification schemes presented in Section 2.2.1.
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Table 4. Comparison of Failure and Reliability Analysis Approaches. HCI refers to human-
computer interaction. CIM refers to computer-integrated manufacturing systems. DED
refers to discrete event dynamic systems.
Approach Application
or Domain
Scope of Results Failures Covered
Laprie [30] Dependability
Computing
General System and Human
Carlson [6] Mobile robots General Robot
Norman [40] HCI General Human
Kokkinaki and CIM Specific to a system System
Valavanis [28]
Sheldon et al. [49] Software Specific to a system Software
Tchangani [54] General Specific to a system System
Ramaswamy and DED Specific to a system System
Valavanis [45]
Gonza´lez et al. [20] Manipulators Specific to a system System
Simmons et al. [50] Autonomous
systems
Specific to a system Software
Table 5. Strengths and Weaknesses of Analysis Approaches.
Approach Strengths Weaknesses
Laprie [30] Completeness, widely accepted Not detailed enough for mo-
bile robot applications
Norman [40] Completeness, widely accepted Does not cover system fail-
ures
Kokkinaki and Can validate a system’s reliability System-specific,
Valavanis [28] Complete model required
Sheldon et al. [49] Can validate a system’s reliability System-specific,
Complete model required
Tchangani [54] Can validate a system’s reliability System-specific,
Complete model required
Ramaswamy and Can validate a system’s reliability System-specific,
Valavanis [45] Complete model required
Gonza´lez et al. [20] Can validate a system’s reliability System-specific,
Complete model required
Simmons et al. [50] Can validate a system’s reliability System-specific,
Few languages supported
20
2.3 Fault-tolerance Systems
The majority of failure-related work encountered in the robotics literature is focused on
creating fault-tolerance systems that can detect, isolate, and/or recover from failures.
Fault-tolerance work is of interest to this meta-study for two reasons. First, each study that
produces a fault-tolerance system for robots has assumed certain characteristics of robot
failures to be true. For example, a method may require that all fault states be modeled,
assuming that novel failures are scarce or uninteresting. It is of interest to see if the
community as a whole agrees on these characteristics. Second, fault-tolerance researchers
and developers are potential consumers of the results of this study. The community as a
whole can benefit from knowledge of documented failures that would, for example, help
them to determine if the majority of failures are easy or difficult to detect and diagnose, or
could be handled by automatic recovery. This section provides a brief overview of the last
six years of work in this area, grouped by approach. Purely model-based methods are
covered in Section 2.3.1. Hybrid approaches are covered in Section 2.3.2. Fault-tolerance
systems which use expert systems techniques for the Artificial Intelligence community are
presented in Section 2.3.3. Data centric (processing and filtering) techniques for
fault-tolerance are presented in Section 2.3.4. Finally, relevant work in the new field of
Autonomic Computing, which is developing systems that are self-configuring,
self-protecting, self-optimizing, and self-healing, is surveyed in Section 2.3.5.
2.3.1 Model-based Fault-tolerance Systems
The majority of fault-tolerance systems found in the literature are model-based. These
methods use models of the target system to predict the correct values for input data. These
predictions are compared to real data from the target system to detect and isolate potential
faults. Failures are typically assumed to be caused by actuator or sensor faults, though
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technically the range of failures that can be diagnosed depends only on the constraints of
the modeling method. Catastrophic failures are typically assumed to be either trivial to
detect or impossible to recover from, so the majority of recent efforts are focused on
minor failures which are difficult to detect and diagnose, as in slow degradations or
intermittent failures. Model-based methods assume that novel failures are scarce and
difficult to automatically recover from and are therefore of less interest than known
failures. These methods also assume that everything that needs to be known to accurately
detect and diagnose failures can be modeled.
Some examples of purely model-based fault-tolerance systems include Kawabata,
Akamatsu, and Asama’s [27] model-based diagnosis system for an autonomous mobile
robot which breaks down a complete robot system into modules that can be modeled
(expected output for a given input is known). In [61] Washington presents a preliminary
attempt to create a fault detection system for rovers using a combination of Markov
models and Kalman filters.
Three purely model-based methods were designed specifically for wheeled mobile
robots. Dixon, Walker, and Dawson [17] developed a mathematical model of mobility
faults to detect changes in the wheel’s radius, and slipping or skidding faults. Goel,
Dedeoglu, Roumeliotis, and Sukhatme in [19] use a Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation
technique based on a set of eight Kalman filters, each with a model of expected values for
normal and fault states (sensor and flat-tire failures), whose output is filtered through a
neural network to decide the state of the robot. Meng, Zhen, Biswas, and Sarkar describe
a fault-tolerance system in [26] where bond-graphs are used to model the robot system,
and temporal casual graphs (TCG’s) are used to detect and isolate faults in motors.
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2.3.2 Hybrid Fault-tolerance Systems
Purely model-based methods fail when a novel failure is encountered or when the model is
inaccurate. Hybrid fault-tolerance systems which use qualitative reasoning or learning
methods along with models have been developed to help eliminate this weakness. These
approaches tend to assume, like purely model-based approaches, that interesting failures
are difficult to detect and diagnose. Unmodeled effects like the environment, and states
like novel failures are assumed to be important. On the other hand, these approaches tend
to assume that those effects will remain stable over time or will change slowly enough for
training to compensate.
Deuker, Perrier, and Amy [16] present a neuro-symbolic hybrid system for
diagnosis of faults in unmanned underwater vehicles. Combastel, Gentil, and Rognon in
[12] present a fuzzy logic, model-based approach to fault isolation in electrical systems.
Wang, Yamasaki, Yumoto, Ohkawa, Komoda, and Myasaka present in [60] a stochastic
qualitative reasoning method which tracks the state of a real time system. In [29] Lamine
and Kabanza describe a monitoring system based on temporal fuzzy logic for use with
behavior-based robots.
Some approaches use training to mitigate the effects of inaccurate and incomplete
models. Mackey, James, Park, and Zak present in [32] an overview of an extensive
architecture for failure prediction, detection, and isolation for autonomous systems which
uses both quantitative modeling, qualitative reasoning, and training methods. Other
techniques work only at the symbolic level, using only casual or partial causal models of
the target system. A multiple robot fault-tolerance system presented by Long and Murphy
in [31] uses only partial casual models of the system combined with active diagnosis
(probing) to isolate faults.
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2.3.3 Expert System Based Fault-tolerance Systems
Expert system based fault-tolerance systems capture the diagnosis process used by human
experts. Diagnosis techniques that take this approach are more common in medical
diagnosis and have not, to date, been developed specifically for robotic systems.
Nevertheless, they do have an advantage for challenging field domains like USAR and
MOUT (where full-automation is not possible in the immediate future) in that they are
easier for humans to interact with. Three fault-tolerance systems which use this approach
are of particular interest because they have a promising feature for mobile robotics
applications ([47] and [46]) or have been used in field environments [21]. In [47] Rymon
presents a system for assisting physicians in the treatment of patients with multiple
traumas. This approach is of interest because it is recovery-based in that it is not
concerned with finding the source of the problem, but instead focuses on the steps
required to return the subject (patient) to a normal state. Reed [46] presents a diagnosis
method that correctly identifies multiple defects using a recognition-based reasoning
module trained from an existing knowledge base. Multiple-simultaneous fault diagnosis is
still considered to be a difficult problem in robot fault-tolerance systems. Helfman, Baur,
Dumer, Hanratty, and Ingham [21] describe an expert diagnostic system which has
actually been fielded by the US Army.
2.3.4 Data Centric Fault-tolerance Systems
Data centric fault-tolerance approaches are focused on using incoming data to detect and
isolate anomalies. These fault-tolerance approaches assume that failure states present
distinctly different data signatures from normal states and each other, and that all the data
needed to find those signatures are present in the system. Hung and Zhao [23] present a
diagnostic approach for systems with large amounts of data coming in from similar and/or
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distinct sets of sensors which uses a combination of existing signal processing and
reasoning techniques. Madden and Nolan describe a learning algorithm called IFT in [33]
which creates fault trees from classified raw sensor data. In [51] Soika presents a failure
detection framework based on probabilistic analysis of correlation between redundant
sensor readings.
2.3.5 Fault-tolerance in Autonomic Computing
Another area of research concerned with the reliability of systems is Autonomic
Computing. Researchers in this new field are interested in creating systems that are
self-configuring, self-protecting, self-optimizing, and (most importantly for this paper)
self-healing. It is the self-reflective nature of this approach that makes its eventual
application to intelligent robotics likely. To date, work in the Autonomic Computing
community on self-healing is preliminary in nature. It has not yet established the
characteristics that will eventually set it apart from the broader fault-tolerance community,
therefore its applicability to this meta-study is the same as that of the larger fault-tolerance
community. This section provides a survey of current work in this area, for future
reference.
Candea [5] has developed an application-generic Java-based fault detection and
recovery system designed to enable web-based service providers to develop systems that
are robust to transient software failures. In comparison to traditional fault-tolerance
approaches, Candea’s is a hybrid model-based system. In [18] Dong’s model-based
approach to self-healing uses software agents developed to handle a specific type of
failure by detecting, analyzing, and recovering from those failures. Tohma [57] describes
a data driven means of achieving fault tolerance in distributed Autonomic Computing
environments where many duplicate service providers are available. The paper presents
mechanisms which can be used to ensure that the system’s registry only provides
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“healthy” alternatives to clients. A simple voting scheme among peers is used to identify
(and subsequently exclude) faulty service providers.
Other research efforts in Autonomic Computing have provided high-level views of
how to approach the problem of self-healing. Sterritt [53] discusses how the new field of
Autonomic Computing can be used to achieve the goals of Dependable Computing. The
paper strongly advocates grounding the new field on the concepts and definitions of key
terms like dependability, failures, errors, faults, and tolerance (see Laprie’s work [30])
long established in the older field. Minsky [35] concludes that self-healing will be
impossible without imposing some form of regularity in the system. Minsky’s solution is a
system which provides that regularity via laws which are analogous to the basic laws of
nature. The paper presents a system designed to enforce those laws.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the general fault-tolerance approaches presented in this
section as they relate to this study. Table 6 lists each approach’s assumptions about the
failures they were designed to handle. Table 7 provides a synopsis of the benefits this
study can provide to researchers and designers of each approach to fault-tolerance for
mobile robots. As Table 6 shows, researchers in this area do not agree on the
characteristics of failures a fault-tolerance system should be able to handle. None of the
studies discussed in this section presented any evidence of having investigated the kinds of
failures robots encounter. Therefore, it is likely that their approach was determined by
their background (e.g. control theoretics for model-based and hybrid systems or AI for
expert systems) instead of experience with robot failures. Table 7 shows that this is one of
several reasons that the fault-tolerance community can benefit from this meta-study. All
the approaches can benefit from knowledge of common failures for a target domain.
Model-based and hybrid approaches in particular can use the frequency of failures and
relative probability of failure for robot subsystems presented in Chapter Five as
high-fidelity estimates for USAR and MOUT environments.
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Table 6. Assumptions Made by Fault-tolerance Approaches About Mobile Robot Failures.
Approach Assumptions about failures
Model-based All factors that affect failures can be modeled.
Detection and diagnosis of interesting failures is hard.
Novel failures are scarce and difficult to automatically recover from.
Actuator and sensor failures are common.
Hybrid Novel failures are important.
Detection and diagnosis of interesting failures is hard.
Some factors that affect failures cannot be modeled accurately.
Factors that affect failures are stable or change slowly enough for train-
ing to compensate.
Expert system Human intervention may be needed for successful diagnosis and re-
covery.
Limited knowledge of the target system is required for diagnosis and
recovery.
Data centric Failure states present distinctly different data signatures from normal
states and each other.
All the data needed to find those signatures are present in the system.
Table 7. How Fault-tolerance Approaches Can Benefit from this Study.
Approach How approach can benefit from this study
Model-based
and Hybrid
Typically uses probabilistic methods which require the probability of
the system entering a given failure state.
Needs to know common failures to check for when modeling a system.
Expert system If failures cannot be handled automatically, additional work in this area
is needed to create technician support and operator alerting systems.
Needs to know common failures to check for when creating a knowl-
edge base.
Data centric Needs to know common failures to determine the sensors and other
data required for detection and diagnosis.
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2.4 Summary
This Chapter has provided a summary of related work including seven studies on robot
reliability, nine failure and reliability analysis approaches, and 22 fault tolerant systems
for mobile robots. It has established the uniqueness and potential benefits of this thesis, a
detailed study on how mobile robots fail in field environments, within the larger robotics
community.
Two studies were found in the literature that, like this meta-study, examined robot
failures from multiple sources. Both covered industrial manipulators used primarily in the
automotive industry. Beauchamp and Stobbe [1] examined documented human-robot
system accidents from nine different studies. Starr, Wynne, and Kennedy [52] surveyed
failure and maintenance reports from two large automotive plants. These meta-studies
were found to be less complete, only human or robot failures were considered, though
Starr et al.’s study examined more robots total (200 compared to the 28 considered here).
Overall Section 2.1 established that this thesis is unique in three respects: it covers both
human and robot failures, is focused on robot field failures in the USAR and MOUT
domains, and is the only meta-study that covers mobile robot failures.
Section 2.2 examined existing failure classification schemes from the
dependability computing [30], human-computer interaction (HCI) [40], and robotics [6]
communities, as well as relevant reliability validation methods from the robotics and
control theoretic literature. This section established that no existing approach to failure
analysis is suitable for the task of examining mobile robot field failures. The classification
schemes developed for dependability computing and HCI are not detailed and complete
enough, respectively. Formal validation methods are restricted to applications which can
be specified using their respective modeling technique, and can only be applied to a single
system (e.g. robot model) and/or a single task at a time. Therefore, this meta-study uses a
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new characterization approach, and described in detail in Chapter Three, which defines its
own novel taxonomy drawn from the classification schemes presented in this section.
Fault-tolerance work is of interest to this meta-study for two reasons. Each study
which produces a fault-tolerance system for robots has assumed certain characteristics of
robot failures. Fault-tolerance researchers and developers are potential consumers of the
results of this study. Section 2.3 provides a brief overview of the last six years of work in
this area, grouped by approach. Also included is a brief synopsis of recent work in the
new field of Autonomic Computing on self-healing systems. It is concluded that
researchers in this area do not agree on the characteristics of failures a fault-tolerance
system should be able to handle, and that none of the studies presented evidence of having
investigated the kinds of failures robots encounter. Therefore, all the fault-tolerant
approaches can benefit from knowledge of common failures for a target domain. In
particular, fault-tolerance approaches that use probabilities to detect and/or diagnose
failure can use the frequency of failures and relative probability of failure for robot
subsystems presented in Chapter Five as high-fidelity estimates for USAR and MOUT
applications. Examples of these would be [25], [32], [51], [54], and [61]. In addition,
approaches which use active probing, namely Long and Murphy [31], would also benefit
from the incorporation of probability data to rank hypotheses, reducing the cost of
diagnosis by ensuring that the most likely hypotheses are checked first.
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Chapter Three
Taxonomy of Failures and Metrics
This chapter describes the approach taken in this thesis to examine mobile robot failures
in the urban search and rescue (USAR) and military operations is urban terrain (MOUT)
application domains. As discussed in Chapter Two, existing approaches for failure
analysis in the dependability computing [30], human-computer interaction [40], and
robotics [6] domains are not detailed or complete enough for the purposes of this
meta-study. The past experience in each of these domains was applied to create the new
approach.
This approach was developed iteratively as examples and results were gathered
from the 13 studies that make up this meta-study. As a result, it is both a tool used to
create the findings of this thesis, and a product of those findings. The fact that no approach
for mobile robot failure analysis existed when the 13 studies were performed was a
serious drawback to this work. Each study used its own approach, few of which were
described in sufficient detail to allow conversion of the results into a common framework.
This chapter endeavors to create a precisely defined and easily applied approach to mobile
robot failure analysis which others can use in their particular application domain without
similar difficulties.
Section 3.1 provides definitions of key terms like mobile robots, field
environments, and failure used throughout the paper. Next, the novel taxonomy of mobile
robot failures, one contribution of this thesis, drawn from the robotics, human-computer
interaction and dependability computing communities will be presented in Section 3.2.
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The taxonomy uses classes to capture the source of the failure which can be either physical
(system or robot) or human. Two attributes are also included to describe the severity of the
failure in terms of its repairability and impact. Finally, Section 3.3 describes the formulas
used to convert the available raw failure and usage data into reliability metrics.
3.1 Terminology
This section will define a few of the key terms used throughout the rest of the thesis. For a
complete list of definitions see Appendix A.
All of the platforms described in Section 4.1 can be considered to be mobile
robots. A mobile robot is defined as a mechanical device that can sense and interact with
its environment. It may possess any level of autonomy with respect to its human
operator(s), from manual (where the human has complete control) to fully autonomous
(where the robot can carry out assigned tasks on its own). All of the robots can also be
called unmanned ground vehicles (UGV’s) which are ground-based mobile robots. The
majority of the robots considered in all 13 studies are teleoperated, or manually controlled
by an operator at a distance that is too great for the operator to see what the robot is
doing [36].
This paper is primarily concerned with mobile robots used in field environments.
A field environment is defined as an environment which has not been modified to ensure
the safety of the robot or to enhance its performance. Conditions a robot may encounter in
USAR or MOUT field environments include: dirt, standing water, rain, intense heat,
intense cold, confined spaces (see Figure 4), uneven surfaces (see Figure 5), the presence
of obstacles with unpredictable movement, and hostile agents. Field robots used by the
military and for USAR have to be packed and transported to remote locations. Robots
designed for field environments are assumed to work outdoors, though generally not in
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Figure 4. A Confined Space Training Maze.
Figure 5. A Rubble Pile Used for USAR Training.
rain or snow. They are expected to handle rough terrain, tolerate dirt and dust, and even
multi-story falls.
Reliability metrics are susceptible to differences in the criteria used to determine if
an event can be called a failure. Where standard criteria do not exist, reliability studies
will necessarily select criteria based on the needs of the individual or group assessing the
usefulness of the technology for a new task. In these cases, it is difficult to directly
compare results across studies or to apply findings to new applications. This meta-study
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uses a general definition of failure so that the findings reported here can be readily applied
and compared to results from similar studies.
For the purposes of this paper, a failure is defined as the inability of the robot or its
support equipment to function normally. Both complete breakdowns and noticeable
degradations are included. An example of a complete breakdown encountered in the
MicroVGTV’s is a failure of the control system where the robot becomes unresponsive, or
freezes. An example of a noticeable degradation is a faulty camera cable causing signal
loss from a camera mounted on a robot. The rest of the robot platform, including any
additional cameras, would not be affected by this failure. Such degradations may or may
not affect the robot’s ability to complete a task. A task which requires stereo vision, for
example, could not be performed with a single camera.
Support equipment is defined as equipment that is not physically part of the robot
and is required for the robot to complete its mission or task. This includes traditional
support equipment like tethers and operator control units (OCU’s). Support equipment
also includes maintenance equipment required to keep the robot operational, such as
battery chargers and recording equipment. In most scientific, USAR, and MOUT
scenarios there are often many stakeholders (individuals who are interested in and are
influenced by the robot’s actions). The varied information needed by each stakeholder
(e.g. commanding officer, medical doctor, and human-robot interaction researcher) is
rarely deliverable in real time; therefore recording equipment is often required for the
robot’s mission.
Rigorously applying specific criteria to a new domain or application area is a
challenging task. For example, the reliability studies [6][7] relied on the judgment of
experienced robot operators. The operators were asked to apply this definition of failure as
they saw fit, based on their knowledge of the robot platform. In cases where the normal
behavior of the robot can be described in measurable terms (e.g. rate of progress toward
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goal or the amount of information processed from incoming sensors), a more precise
definition of failure can be enforced. For the field applications covered in this paper, this
information is not available. Test and Evaluation Coordination Office’s studies at Fort
Leonard Wood [43] and the Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue (CRASAR) [4],
which provided the 13 studies examined in this thesis, have begun the process of
identifying the characteristics of normal use of robots in the field domains of MOUT and
USAR respectively, but their work is still in the preliminary stages.
3.2 Taxonomy of Failures
In order to gain insight from robot failures, individual failures cannot be treated as unique
events. Meaningful common attributes must be found and used to categorize failures into
well defined groups. To provide a foundation for such insights, this section defines a
classification or taxonomy which can be meaningfully applied to any failure that a mobile
robot used in the field might encounter. The taxonomy, shown in Figure 6, was created not
only from experience within the robotics [6][7] community, but it also draws from the
human-computer interaction [40] and dependability computing [30] communities as well.
Though the taxonomy was designed to cover the range of field failures, it is expected to be
sufficient for any application of mobile robots.
The taxonomy uses classes to capture the source of failure (or what Laprie [30]
would call the fault), which is first divided into physical and human branches, following
dependability computing practice. Physical failures are further subdivided based on
common systems found in all mobile robot platforms, these being effector, sensor, control
system, power, and communications. The following definitions were used to classify
individual physical failures:
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Figure 6. The Taxonomy of Mobile Robot Failures Used in this Analysis. Classes are
shown with solid lines, and attributes with dashed lines.
1. Effector. Any devices that perform actuation and any connections related to those
devices. Examples would be the motors, grippers, and treads or wheels.
2. Control system. Any devices or manufacturer-provided software that issue
commands (at the symbolic or signal level) to other devices or software within the
robot system and/or support operator interaction with the system. For example, an
on-board computer, joystick, motor controller, or display unit.
3. Sensor. Any devices that sense the robot’s state or the state of the environment and
any connections related to those devices. Examples would be cameras and laser
range finders.
4. Power. Any component that affects the power system of the robot. Examples would
be the batteries, chargers, and various connections allowing the robot to be powered.
5. Communications. Any devices that provide communication between the robot and
its OCU’s. Examples would be tethers and wireless access points.
Using Laprie’s categorization from dependability computing, human failures are
subdivided into design and interaction. Design failures are caused by faults created during
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the design of a robot system, and are not covered in any of the studies this paper examines.
Drawing from Norman’s taxonomy [40], which is widely accepted in the human-computer
interaction community, interaction is subdivided into mistakes and slips. Mistakes are
caused by fallacies in conscious processing, such as misunderstanding the situation and
doing the wrong thing. Slips are caused by fallacies in unconscious processing, where the
operator attempted to do the right thing but was unsuccessful.
Each failure, physical or human, falls into exactly one of these classes. Physical
failures also have two attributes, repairability and impact. The impact of the physical
failure is evaluated based on its effect on the robot’s assigned task or mission. A terminal
robot failure is one that terminates the robot’s current mission. A non-terminal failure
introduces some noticeable degradation of the robot’s capability to perform its mission.
The repairability of the failure is described as field-repairable and non-field-repairable. A
failure is considered to be field-repairable if it can be repaired under the following
conditions:
1. Only the equipment that commonly accompanies the robot into the field is available.
For example, if a small robot which is transported in a single backpack encounters a
failure, that failure can only be labeled as field-repairable if the tools required for
the repair are part of a small toolkit that fits in the backpack along with the robot
and its support equipment.
2. Favorable environmental conditions. The environmental conditions are considered
to be favorable if all conditions, such as dampness (e.g. from rain) and light level,
do not interfere with or prevent the repair. Very few failures could be classified as
field-repairable if they had to be repairable under the worst environmental
conditions encountered in USAR and MOUT environments. Therefore, this
constraint was included to keep the classification process simple, while ensuring
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that a failure’s repairability depends only on the difficulty of the repair process, not
on the time and location of the repair.
3. The only personnel available are trained operators. This means that the expertise
required to complete the repair has to be part of an operator’s training for that type
of robot.
It should be noted that packing procedures and operator training requirements
were not standardized for robots in USAR and MOUT scenarios prior to this meta-study.
Therefore, the field-repairable classification, as defined here, cannot be applied directly to
the examples found in the 13 studies. Instead, the repairability results presented in
Chapter Five were generated based on whether or not each failure was repaired in the
field, termed field-repaired versus non-field-repaired. For now, this provides a
deterministic estimator for each example failure’s repairability.
This taxonomy is used in Chapter Five to classify and study mobile robot failures
in the field. For CRASAR’s reliability studies [6][7], CRASAR’s field experiments with
the Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department (HCFRD) [10], and TECO’s
studies [42] it was used to place each failure reported into a single class (or leaf) from
Figure 6. The classification of the data from CRASAR’s World Trade Center (WTC)
studies [34][8] was more difficult. Aside from four notable terminal failures, these studies
recorded the operator’s response to minor problems, rather than the failures themselves.
Also, the data presented in the WTC studies only appears in terms of the categories
defined in the WTC Engineering study [34]. The details needed to classify the more
common failures themselves are missing. For this reason, the categories used in the WTC
studies could fall into several classes within the taxonomy, depending on the
circumstances surrounding each individual failure.
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3.3 Calculations
This section will present the calculations used to transform raw failure and usage data into
reliability metrics for mobile robots used in the field. These equations were originally and
primarily used to analyze the data in the reliability studies [6][7] presented in detail in
Section 4.6. They were also used to summarize any data provided by the HCFRD
study [10], the WTC studies [34][8], and TECO’s studies [42] (see Section 4.2).
All the formulas were taken from the IEEE standards presented in [24]. The mean
time between failures or MTBF is calculated by equation (1). This metric provides a
rough estimate of how long one can expect to use a robot without encountering failures.
This formula was slightly modified, as defined in equation (2), for the follow-up reliability
study [7] in order to perform statistical analysis on the results. All other MTBF statistics
reported in this paper were calculated using equation (1). Another metric presented in this
paper is the failure rate, which is simply the inverse of MTBF.
MTBF =
Number of Hours Robot Was in Use
Number of Failures (1)
MTBF =
∑n
i=2 Hours Usage Between Fi and Fi−1
Number of Failures , {F1, F2, . . . , Fn} are failures (2)
The projected availability of the robot is calculated by equation (4), where the
mean time to repair, MTTR is defined by equation (3). Availability, also called reliability,
should be interpreted as the probability that the robot will be free of failures at a particular
point in time. Average downtime is the average amount of time between the occurrence of
the failure and the completion of the repair that fixed it (see equation (5)).
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MTTR =
Number of Hours Spent Repairing
Number of Repairs (3)
Availability =
MTBF
MTBF + MTTR
· 100% (4)
AverageDowntime =
∑n
i=1 Time Repair of Fi Completed − Time Fi Occurred
Number of Repairs (5)
Other values derived for this meta-study were calculated using standard formulas.
For example, the probability that a failure was caused by a component from class (from
the taxonomy, e.g. sensor, effector, slip, etc.) c is simply (6).
P (c|failure) = Number of Failures Caused by a component from c
Total Number of Failures (6)
3.4 Summary
This chapter describes the approach taken in this thesis to examine mobile robot failures
in the field. The fact that no existing approach for mobile robot failure analysis was
present at the time of the 13 studies was a serious drawback to this work. Each study used
its own approach, few of which were described in sufficient detail to allow conversion of
the results into a common framework. Therefore this approach was developed iteratively
as examples and results were gathered from the 13 studies which make up this meta-study.
As a result this taxonomy is both a tool used to create the findings of this thesis, and a
product of those findings.
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Section 3.1 provided definitions of key terms like mobile robots, field
environments, and failure used throughout the paper. Failure is defined as the inability of
the robot or its support equipment to function normally. Section 3.2 presented the novel
taxonomy of mobile robot failures, one contribution of this thesis, drawing existing failure
classification schemes from the robotics, human-computer interaction and dependability
computing communities. The taxonomy uses classes to capture the source of the failure
that can be either physical (system or robot) or human. Five subclasses, based on common
subsystems found in all robot systems, fall within the physical branch. These are effector,
sensor, control system, power, and communications. Human failures are divided into
design and interaction subclasses, the latter of which is further subdivided into mistakes
and slips. Two attributes are also included to describe the severity of a physical failure in
terms of its repairability and impact on the robot’s mission at the time of the failure. The
values given to these attributes are field-repairable and non-field-repairable, and terminal
and non-terminal respectively.
Section 3.3 describes the formulas used to convert the available raw failure and
usage data into reliability metrics which were taken from the IEEE standards presented
in [24]. One metric used was the mean time between failures (MTBF), which provides a
rough estimate of how long one can expect to use a robot without encountering failures.
Projected availability, also called reliability, was also used. This metric is reported as a
percentage and should be interpreted as the probability that the robot will be free of
failures at a particular point in time. The average downtime and probability that a failure
was caused by a component from class c were calculated using standard formulas.
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Chapter Four
Source Studies
This chapter provides a detailed description of the information examined in this thesis. As
this is a meta-study of mobile robot failures in the field, the information was gathered
from 13 studies of mobile robot use in field environments. The chapter begins in
Section 4.1 by describing the 28 ground-based mobile robots covered by this meta-study.
Section 4.2 then provides an overview of the information available from each of the 13
studies. Finally, the goals, experimental approach, and relevant results and findings are
presented for each study in Sections 4.3 through 4.6.
The studies come from two primary sources. The Center for Robot-Assisted
Search and Rescue (CRASAR) at the University of South Florida, which studies the use of
robot technology in urban search and rescue (USAR) applications and spends more than
200 hours a year in the field, provided five of the 13 studies. These include two studies of
the robot-assisted response to the World Trade Center (WTC) disaster (covered in
Section 4.3), two reliability studies of day-to-day use of mobile robots (Section 4.6), and a
set of field experiments conducted with the Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department
(HCFRD) described in Section 4.5. The remaining eight (Section 4.4) were provided by
the Test and Evaluation Coordination Office (TECO) at Fort Leonard Wood [42], which
periodically conducts experiments to determine the suitability of a robotic platform for use
in specified military operations (e.g. military operations in urban terrain or MOUT).
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4.1 Robots Surveyed
This section describes the total of 28 robots considered in this paper. They represent 15
different models from seven manufacturers and range from small (less than 10 pounds)
tracked vehicles capable of changing their geometry, to a modified M1 tank (over 60
tonnes). The list of robot models appears in Table 8 with the model name, manufacturer,
total number of robots (over all studies), and the studies which analyzed the use of that
model. CRASAR’s reliability studies [6][7] are referred to as Reliability. CRASAR’s
WTC analyses [34][8] and HCFRD study [10] are denoted by WTC and HCFRD
respectively. TECO’s studies are collectively referred to as TECO. Table 9 presents basic
information on each model including the size, weight, communication method, and
traction method. The size of a robot is man-packable, man-portable, or not man-portable
[34]. A man-packable robot can be safely carried by one or two people in backpacks.
Man-portable robots are larger and cannot be easily carried into the field by a person.
They can be transported in a HUMMV or personal car and one or more persons can safely
lift them in and out of the vehicle. Robots which are not man-portable require additional
(usually specialized) equipment for transport, e.g. a heavy truck or trailer.
The smallest robots examined are Inuktun’s MicroTracs and MicroVGTV
platforms (Figure 7) which are no larger than 15.5 by 30.5 cm. Both are tracked vehicles
without onboard computers. Both have a microphone, speaker, a motor-driven
manual-focus CCD camera, and a camera tilt unit with halogen lighting. MicroVGTV
platforms also have the ability to adjust the shape of their chassis to raise or lower the
camera tilt unit and change the track profile. MicroVGTV’s are commercially available
and were originally designed for chemical and nuclear inspection. The MicroTracs
platform was an experimental design which attempted to meet Blitch’s criteria [2] for
USAR and MOUT scenarios. Both are built from experience; over ten years of
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Table 8. The Robots Examined in this Meta-study. The column denoted by # contains the
number of robots of that model included in this meta-study.
Model Manufacturer # Studies
MicroTracs Inuktun 1 Reliability,HCFRD,WTC
MicroVGTV Inuktun 3 Reliability,HCFRD,WTC
Urban iRobot 5 Reliability,HCFRD,TECO
SOLEM Foster-Miller 2 WTC,TECO
URBOT Foster-Miller 2 TECO
Packbot iRobot 4 Reliability
MATILDA Mesa Assoc. 1 TECO
Talon Foster-Miller 1 TECO
ATRV-Jr iRobot 1 Reliability
ATRV iRobot 1 Reliability
SARGE Yamaha 1 TECO
ARTS All Seasons Vehicles 1 TECO
DEUCE Caterpillar 2 TECO
D-7G Caterpillar 1 TECO
PANTHER US Army 2 TECO
Summary 28
Table 9. The Robots’ Characteristics.
Model Size Weight(lbs) Comms Traction
MicroTracs man-packable 8 Tether Track
MicroVGTV man-packable 8 Tether Track
SOLEM man-packable 33 Both Track
URBOT man-packable 33 Both Track
Urban man-packable 35 Wireless Track
Packbot man-packable 42 Both Track
MATILDA man-packable 50 Wireless Track
Talon man-portable 85 Both Track
ATRV-Jr man-portable 110 Both Wheel
ATRV man-portable 260 Both Wheel
SARGE man-portable 298 Wireless Wheel
ARTS not man-portable 5,800 Wireless Track
DEUCE not man-portable 35,000 Wireless Track
D-7G not man-portable 59,000 Wireless Track
PANTHER not man-portable 60,000 Wireless Track
43
Figure 7. Inuktun MicroVGTV (left) and MicroTracs (right) Robots. MicroVGTV photo
courtesy of Inuktun Services Ltd.
development work with similar platforms proceeded the design of these robots. Though
they have limited sensing capabilities, both have been shown to be very useful in a variety
of USAR scenarios (with roughly 400 hours of field usage logged to date by CRASAR).
Their small size enables them to explore areas humans and dogs simply cannot fit inside.
They are also the most portable. The robot and all support equipment that is needed can be
packed into a single backpack and carried into the field.
The next size group includes the SOLEM and URBOT (Figure 8) from
Foster-Miller Incorporated, the Urban and its successor the Packbot (Figure 9) from
iRobot Corporation, and MATILDA (Figure 10) from Mesa Associates. All are tracked
vehicles which carry one or more cameras and lighting. The Urbans also have a set of 13
sonar range sensors. All were developed between 1999 and 2001 for military operations,
specifically MOUT, and continue to undergo modifications. These robots require two
people to carry the robot and its support equipment into the field and therefore are at the
limit of what can be considered man-packable. They typically use wireless
communications to connect to the operator control unit (OCU). They carry their own
batteries and a computer inside their chassis. An onboard computer and larger sensor
payload capabilities, than Inuktun’s platforms, enable these robots to function with varied
levels of autonomy. (The term autonomy applied to mobile robots is the level of
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Figure 8. Foster-Miller Solem (left) and URBOT Built on a Solem Base (right). Solem
photo courtesy of Foster-Miller. URBOT photo courtesy of US Unmanned Ground Vehi-
cles / Systems Joint Project Office (UGV/S JPO).
Figure 9. iRobot ATRV-Jr (left). iRobot Packbot (right) Exploring a Rubble Pile.
supervision required by humans.) Though high levels of autonomy (e.g. navigation and
planning) are still largely experimental and therefore have rarely been used to date in the
field, they can ease the workload of the operator and enable one operator to control groups
of robots.
The Talon (Figure 10) from Foster-Miller, ATRV-Jr (Figure 9) and ATRV from
iRobot, and SARGE (Figure 11) are man-portable. All the robots in this group carry
onboard computers and one or more cameras. They have a wider range and increased
flexibility compared to the man-packable robots due to their ability to carry more
batteries, sensors, and effectors. Talon and the ATRV-Jr are small enough to be used for
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Figure 10. Foster-Miller MATILDA (left) and Talon (right). MATILDA photo courtesy of
UGV/S JPO. Talon photo courtesy of Foster-Miller.
both indoor and outdoor applications. The ATRV and SARGE are much larger platforms
which can only operate in wide open areas but can be modified to carry smaller robots.
These heterogeneous groups, usually referred to as marsupial, have the larger range of the
“mother” robot as well as the maneuverability of the “baby” robots. The man-portable
group varies in maturity from the Talon which was developed around 1999, to the ATRV’s
which have been in production for about six years, to SARGE which is built on a mature
recreational All Terrain Vehicle platform.
The largest group of robots is made up of the ARTS, DEUCE (Figure 12), D7-G,
and PANTHER (Figure 13). All of these platforms have been adapted from commercially
available heavy construction equipment or military platforms. They require special
equipment to transport and weigh in excess of 5 tons. These platforms are too large for
typical USAR or squad-level MOUT scenarios. TECO has equipped each of them with a
standard teleoperation interface and tested them for demining and debris clearing tasks.
4.2 Information Available by Study
This section presents an overview of the information available from the 13 studies which
have examined mobile robot use in the field. Table 10 outlines the data collection and
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Figure 11. SARGE is Built on a Yamaha Breeze ATV Base. SARGE Photo courtesy of
UGV/S JPO.
Figure 12. ARTS Built on a All Seasons Vehicles MD-70 Base (left) and Caterpillar
DEUCE (right). ARTS photo taken from TECO’s ARTS study [59]. DEUCE photo cour-
tesy of Caterpillar.
Figure 13. Caterpillar D-7G and PANTHER Built on a US Army M1 Tank Base. Photos
courtesy of UGV/S JPO.
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Table 10. Overview of Data Collection Method Information Available from Each Study.
Rel. refers to CRASAR’s reliability studies.
Study Failure
Defined
Failures
Classified
Perspective Granularity of
Data Collection
Rel.[6][7] Yes Yes Engineering Hours
WTC[34][8] Yes Yes Both Seconds
HCFRD[10] Yes Yes HRI Hours
PANTHER[13] No Yes Both Unknown
DEUCE[14] No No Both Unknown
ARTS[59] No No Both Unknown
CBRNLOE[55] No No Both Unknown
D7[3] No No Both Unknown
SARGE[44] No No Both Unknown
UGVROP[62] No No Both Unknown
URBOT[43] No No Both Unknown
analysis methods used in each study. For each study, whether or not a definition of failures
was provided; whether or not the failures were classified; the perspective of the study as in
engineering, human-robot interaction (HRI), or both; and the granularity of the data
collection process are included. Table 11 provides an overview of the information that was
available and examined for this meta-study. The availability of usage information, count
and descriptions of failures, and the format of the results are included.
These tables show that key information is missing from most of TECO’s
studies [42] including: the definition of failure used, data collection methods, and numeric
results. They also show that the reliability studies [6][7] and the WTC studies [34][8]
differed in both data collection and result generation methods. For this reason, a true
comparative study cannot be performed directly on this set of studies. A goal for this
meta-study was to gather as much information as possible from the material available, and
use that information to begin developing standard methods for collecting and analyzing
mobile robot failure information. The taxonomy presented in Section 3.2 is the result of
that effort.
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Table 11. Overview of Data and Analysis Information Available from Each Study. Rel.
refers to CRASAR’s reliability studies.
Source Data Available
Study Usage # Failures Descriptions Results Presented As
Rel. Original[6] Yes Yes Yes Standard reliability metrics
Rel. Follow-up[7] Yes Yes Yes Above and statistical analysis
WTC[34][8] No No No Frequency and percentages
HCFRD[10] Yes Yes Some List
PANTHER[13] Yes Yes Yes Summary
DEUCE[14] Partial Yes No Summary
ARTS[59] No No No Summary
CBRNLOE[55] No No No Summary
D7[3] No No No Summary
SARGE[44] No No No Summary
UGVROP[62] No No No Summary
URBOT[43] No No No Summary
4.3 CRASAR WTC Studies
Two studies were generated from post-hoc analysis of data collected during CRASAR’s
robot-assisted search and rescue response at the WTC. A detailed analysis on the failures
encountered by CRASAR while using robots was reported in the WTC Engineering
study [34]. The WTC Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) study [8] examined the
human-robot interaction and human-human interaction between the robots, their
operators, and the other USAR professionals that worked with CRASAR during the
rescue phase of the WTC response. The studies cover four robots from two manufacturers
representing three different models. The data span a period of nine days between
September 12th and 21st of 2001. The Engineering study contributed seven overall
findings and a detailed taxonomy of the environmental and robot relationships. The HRI
study provides seventeen findings and eleven recommendations for future work.
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4.3.1 Approach
The WTC studies [34][8] both drew in varying amounts from three sources: video of the
robots’ camera view, field notes, and interviews of the robots’ operators. Video of the
robots’ camera view was recorded each time a robot was deployed (used to search a hole
in the rubble). This resulted in 5.5 hours of video available for analysis. Two sets of field
notes were opportunistically maintained by CRASAR members. As this data were
analyzed, the operators were interviewed for additional details or to clarify ambiguous
cues in the recorded video and field notes.
The WTC HRI study [8] examined all the data in terms of the operating
environment and conditions, agents and skills (human and robot), which of the traditional
USAR tasks the robots were used to perform, overall workflow, and communications. The
WTC Engineering study focused primarily on the video data, attempting to identify cues
for minor to serious failures on the part of the robot or the robot’s operator. For the
Engineering analysis a failure was defined as any event which hindered the progress of the
robot in its search task. Two levels of severity were defined: catastrophic and significant.
A catastrophic failure required that the robot be removed from the void it was searching in
order to be repaired [34]. A significant failure introduced sub-optimal performance[34]
but did not keep the robot from continuing its mission. During the response, new
techniques were developed for operating tethered robots. These allowed the person
feeding the tether to assist the robot operator in overcoming problems. This individual
was referred to as the tether manager.
Five categories were defined for the significant common failures encountered
while using the small Inuktun robots. Two categories were provided for failures where the
tether manager was required to assist the robot through the tether: gravity assist and stuck
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assist. The other three categories were track slippage, occluded camera, and incorrect
lighting. They were defined in [34] as follows:
1. Gravity assist. Events that occur when the tether manager is required to provide
support for the robot through the tether. Reported as the number of instances of
these events.
2. Stuck assist. Events which occur when the tether manager must use the tether to free
the robot from some obstacle or terrain that does not permit the robot to move.
Reported as the number of instances of these events.
3. Track slippage. The amount of time that the track mechanisms do not have
sufficient contact with the ground surface. Reported as a sum of the duration of each
instance in minutes.
4. Occluded camera. Amount of time that the camera view is completely occluded by
objects and debris. Reported as a sum of the duration of each instance in minutes.
5. Incorrect lighting. Amount of time that the lights were completely off or in a
transition between intensities. Reported as a sum of the duration of each instance in
minutes.
This taxonomy was defined for the MicroTracs and MicroVGTV as well as the
fine-grained data collection methods used in the WTC video analysis. It therefore cannot
be applied to the other 11 studies covered in this paper.
It should be noted that Inuktun’s robots were not designed to perform USAR
search tasks. Thus, the definition of failure used in the WTC Engineering study [34] is
technically a broader definition of failure than the one used in this paper (see Section 3.1).
For the purposes of this meta-study, the WTC Engineering study’s definition of failure is
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accepted. This is done in the interests of eventually producing robots which can be
expected to perform better under the extreme conditions encountered during the WTC
rescue response.
4.3.2 Summary of Results
This section will report the overall results of the WTC Engineering study. In studying
these results it is important to keep in mind that the robot and its operator were treated as
one system in the WTC Engineering study. Not all of the minor problems referred to in
Table 12 were the fault of the robot or the physical components that make up the robot.
Some failures were the fault of the humans that interacted with it, and others could not be
helped due to the extreme working conditions.
In the WTC Engineering study [34] the frequency and impact of failures was
analyzed on a much smaller scale than the other 11 studies covered in this thesis. This
analysis revealed that the robots often encountered minor problems (such as track
slippage), 1.4 times per minute on average. Table 12 presents overall statistics from this
analysis. The data is broken down by attempt. An attempt is an event in which a robot is
inserted into a void in order to search that void. Only attempts for which there are
recorded data are included. They are numbered sequentially for simplicity. See [34] for
more details on the conditions under which each attempt occurred. The WTC Engineering
study reported the duration (in seconds) of the track slippage, occluded camera, and
lighting incorrect failure modes. The number of occurrences was not provided for these
classes, though it was for gravity and stuck assists. Without access to the raw data, it is
impossible to combine these two distinct measurements into a single statistic. Table 12
presents the best available summary of unclassified robot field failures from the
robot-assisted response at the WTC. It includes the frequency per minute of gravity and
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Table 12. Failures Encountered at WTC from [34].
Model Attempt #/Min. % of Time
MicroTrac 1 1.8 0.7
MicroTrac 2 1.3 16.7
MicroTrac 3 1.3 4.0
MicroTrac 4 0.3 1.7
MicroTrac 5 4.7 21.3
MicroTrac 6 1.3 32.3
MicroTrac 7 0.0 13.3
MicroVGTV 8 0.1 0.7
Overall Average 1.4 11.7
stuck assists; and the percentage of time spent in the track slippage, occluded camera, or
lighting incorrect failure modes.
According to [34], assistance from the tether manager was needed an average of
2.8 times per minute. On average 11% of the search time was lost per attempt due to
traction slippage, 18% due to camera occlusion, and 6% due to lighting adjustments.
An interesting attribute of the WTC Engineering study is that there were only four
failures that would have been recorded without the detailed analysis that was performed
on the video of the robots’ camera view. The detailed video analysis uncovered 136 cases
in which the tether manager had to assist the robot, and that 33% of the time was spent in
failure modes (tracks slipping, camera occluded, etc.). These minor failures, not recorded
by the other studies, had a significant impact on the robots’ performance.
Several of the WTC HRI study [8] findings regarding the environment and
conditions, robot skills, and communication are of interest in studying human failures in
HRI. The environment was found to be benign as compared to most USAR environments.
The only real environmental hazards encountered by CRASAR personnel were the dust,
which could be managed with standard issue respirators, and the rubble itself. As for
working conditions, CRASAR personnel were found to be cognitively fatigued mainly
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due to lack of sleep. It was also determined that none of the robots used at the WTC were
designed or rated for use in USAR, and that key sensors that might have been needed
could not be ported to the most suitable platforms for confined space operation.
Considering these task analysis results, the performance of the robots as reported in the
Engineering study are surprisingly good. Finally, the communication analysis revealed
that two types of vital information were not getting from the robot to the operator: the
state of the robot, and the state of the robot’s environment.
The source for the data from the WTC studies [34][8] was not available.
Therefore, statistics presented in Chapter Five are taken directly or derived from the
information provided in the studies. Derived statistics were generated in the same manner
as their counterparts in the reliability studies [6][7]. Chapter Three outlined the
definitions, taxonomy, and calculations applied to derive the statistics.
4.4 TECO’s Studies from Fort Leonard Wood
The results from eight studies conducted by the Test and Evaluation Coordination Office
(TECO), part of the Maneuver Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood, have been posted to
the Department of Defense Joint Robotics Program (JRP) library [42]. TECO provides
operational test and evaluation expertise to the Chemical, Engineer and Military Police
Schools and assists in the development and execution of Advanced Warfighting
Experiments (AWE). The overall goal of their studies was to evaluate the feasibility of
using the robotic platforms for their respective assigned tasks in the Future Combat
System (FCS). The experiments focused on safety, maintenance, and possible tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) for each platform.
These studies were performed on the following: an All-Purpose Remote Transport
System (ARTS) for clearing and demining; integration of Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) sensor modules on existing robot platforms (URBOT
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and MATILDA); the delivery of non-lethal munitions from an existing robot platform
(SARGE); a UGV-based rapid obscuration system; a D-7G bulldozer, Deployable
Universal Combat Earthmover (DEUCE), and an M1 tank (each equipped with a
standardized teleoperation system); as well as a variety of smaller platforms (URBOT,
Urban, SOLEM, and Talon). All of these studies were carried out in mock military
operations which can be considered to be high-fidelity (close enough to a real scenario to
produce similar results) field environments.
4.4.1 Approach
For all but the DEUCE study, experimental scenarios were developed and managed by
TECO personnel and subject matter experts (where needed). Questionnaires and reports
were developed and used to record: operator performance, operator feedback, platform
and payload performance, and documentation of unanticipated events (e.g. equipment
failure). These were used to develop the assessments and recommendations which
appeared in each of the studies’ Executive Summaries. Unfortunately, the raw data from
these questionnaires and reports were not available. The documents stored in the JRP
library [42] for each study consisted mainly of the Executive Summary, Pattern of
Analysis (a detailed list of issues explored by the study), blank versions of any
questionnaires or reports developed, and often pictures of the platform(s). Only the
repositories for the CBRNLOE, DEUCE, and M1 PANTHER II studies included a
complete Test Report. The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of each study.
4.4.1.1 ARTS. The All-Purpose Remote Transport System or ARTS platform was
designed to conduct unmanned mine clearing and proofing (verifying that a given path is
free of live mines), booby trap proofing, unmanned breaching of wire obstacles, and
materials handling. The purpose of TECO’s study [59] was to subject the unmanned
platform to various terrain types and realistic missions over large distances. The study was
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also designed to determine which soil conditions and slopes the ARTS platform could
handle.
4.4.1.2 CBRNLOE. In [55] TECO described a limited-objective experiment (LOE) on
the integration of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) sensors on a
ground-based mobile robot. The sensors were packaged as modules which could be easily
added or removed from the robots’ payload. Two small robot platforms were used:
MATILDA and URBOT. The study was performed over a period of four days in a
decommissioned coastal defense bunker in California. Two operators controlled the robots
during the experiments. They were trained beforehand on the CBRN payload and robot
teleoperation.
4.4.1.3 D-7G. The D-7G model bulldozer was modified for the purposes of remote
mine clearing, rubble removal, and hazardous materials handling. TECO’s study
described in [3] was a follow-up on one that was completed a few months before. The
purpose of the follow-up study was to evaluate the changes made to the optical system
(recommended in the first study) and to explore night scenarios which were not conducted
in the first study. In every other aspect the two studies were the same including the robot,
operators, and scenarios designed to test the D-7’s capabilities. Forward-looking infrared
(FLIR) cameras were determined to be essential for night operations.
4.4.1.4 DEUCE. TECO’s study of the Deployable Universal Combat Earthmover
(DEUCE) platform [14] was exploratory in nature. It was designed to determine if
DEUCE could support heavy forces in a combat environment while still meeting the
weight requirements for transport and retain its top speed of 30mph (48 kph). Unlike the
other studies the operator’s tasks were not determined by TECO staff. A battalion from
Fort Leonard Wood was using the platform during their National Testing Center (NTC)
rotation, which lasts 28 days, at Fort Irwin. Aside from a one week period in which
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TECO’s staff was allowed to conduct formal experiments with the soldiers, they mainly
served as observers. The soldiers were trained on the platform prior to this test period.
4.4.1.5 PANTHER. TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13] examined the modified tank’s
utility for mine proofing in a potentially hazardous area. The experiments were conducted
over a period of 32 days at TECO’s test site at Fort Leonard Wood. Nine operators were
trained and evaluated during the experiments. First, the soldiers’ ability to control the
vehicle and to handle payload operations was assessed in a benign environment. Then the
PANTHER was operated in mine proofing scenarios in various terrain and weather
conditions. The study focused on how well the integrated teleoperation system performed,
the platform’s limitations, how quickly it could be converted from manual to remote
operation, and the capability of the installed cameras to assist in remote steering.
4.4.1.6 SARGE. In TECO’s SARGE study [44] the objective was to evaluate the
effectiveness of two non-lethal crowd control munitions delivered from a mobile robot
platform. The munitions were the 40mm Crowd Dispersal Cartridge and the 37mm Grab
Net. They were propelled from the remote vehicle of a SARGE system (consists of a
two-man control vehicle, a HUMMV, and a smaller remote vehicle). The majority of
problems reported in this study dealt with the recently developed non-lethal munitions
rather than the robot platform itself.
4.4.1.7 UGVROP. The use of a robotic platform with added rapid obscuration, and
obscurant generation capabilities was evaluated in TECO’s Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(UGV) Rapid Obscuration Platform (ROP) study [62]. The mobile robot platform was not
specified, but the images included in the repository show a larger HUMMV vehicle
delivering the obscurant and the control vehicle from the SARGE system. The study was
conducted over a two week period at Fort Leonard Wood. As with the SARGE study, the
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majority of problems reported dealt with the obscurant firing and generation systems
rather than the robot platform itself.
4.4.1.8 Urban Robot. Several smaller, man-packable platforms [34] were explored in
TECO’s Urban Robot study [43]. This study focused on the operational effectiveness of
small robot usage for reconnaissance of bunkers and MOUT subterranean operations.
Eight trained operators were asked to operate the robots over a course designed by TECO
staff which included debris, inclines, and stairs. The robots used were: two Urbans, a
SOLEM, an URBOT, and a Talon. The study lasted for four weeks. TECO’s staff
determined that the SOLEM and Urbans were not suited for such operations as they did
not have the maneuverability needed to traverse the course in the target period of time.
The Urbans were also deemed unfit due to their inability to keep mud, sand, and other
small debris encountered in the test course from damaging the drive and manipulator
systems.
4.4.2 Summary of Results
TECO has reported a mean time between failures (MTBF) of less than 20 hours, though
their studies did not provide enough information (see Section 4.2) to validate that figure.
Only the M1 PANTHER II study [13] provided details on each failure encountered. None
provided sufficiently detailed usage information to calculate MTBF. During the 32 day
period of the PANTHER experiments, a total of 35 failures were reported. Most (94%) of
the failures were terminal. Experiments which relied on that robot stopped until the
platform was repaired. Several sensor failures were non-terminal, but reduced the quality
of feedback provided to the operators from the robot platform. The average downtime was
7.31 hours overall, or 7.75 hours excluding non-terminal failures. According to TECO 7.2
days were lost due to unscheduled vehicle maintenance occurring on both robots
simultaneously.
58
The source for the data from TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13] was not
available. Therefore the statistics presented in Chapter Five are taken directly or derived
from the documents provided in [42] for the study. Derived statistics were generated in the
same manner as their counterparts in the reliability studies [6][7]. The method was
described in detail in Chapter Three.
4.5 CRASAR HCFRD Field Experiments
In July of 2001 CRASAR performed a preliminary field study with Hillsborough County
Fire Rescue Department (HCFRD). The purpose of the study was to simulate the use of
robots with a real rescue team responding to an incident, and to collect human-robot
interaction (HRI) data on the event. The study was conducted in a building scheduled for
demolition in downtown Tampa. During the experimental scenarios, CRASAR members
served as robot operators and collected data while HCFRD members directed the
operators and assisted in completing the objectives of each scenario. The data collected
during the field excursion included approximately 8 hours of video, two sets of field notes,
and summaries of informal interviews with the fire professionals and post-excursion
meetings. From this data, the study produced two new scripts (a set of actions which can
be performed by a robot sequentially and/or in parallel) for USAR, determined a suitable
human-to-robot ratio for teleoperated robots, and identified and categorized the failures
encountered. For a complete discussion of this event see [10].
4.5.1 Approach
The tasks were selected by Clint Roberts, Incident Commander (the officer in charge at a
search and rescue event) and HCFRD member, and Chief of Special Operations Rogers.
Four tasks were devised: climb stairs and investigate the upper floors, search a dark and
cluttered area for an unconscious fireman (simulated using a dummy), search the same
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area for an unconscious victim using a FLIR, and explore a floor by entering from a hole
in the ceiling (vertical entry). Three tracked robots were used for data collection: an
Urban, a MicroVGTV, and a MicroTracs. The Urban was run in two different
configurations, with and without a Indigo Alpha forward-looking infrared camera (FLIR).
The Incident Commander worked closely with the primary robot operator(s) during the
four tasks, providing them with a secondary viewpoint of the information coming back
from the robot.
The stair climbing task utilized the Urban to navigate up the stairs while assessing
the environment for structural integrity and environmental indicators of hazards (e.g.
smoke, vapor clouds). This task lasted 24 minutes during which 3.5 flights of stairs were
traversed.
The downed fireman task was to teleoperate the Urban in a darkened and cluttered
floor searching for a simulated downed fireman in a smoky building. The robot entered the
floor from the stairway landing, found the fireman, and returned to the landing. The total
execution time was 18 minutes. The operator and Incident Commander were located in a
room on the far end of the floor, where they could not see (except through the robot’s
camera view) the area covered by the robot. The third task was identical with two
exceptions: a live victim in civilian clothing was used in place of the dummy, and the
FLIR was added to the Urban’s sensor suite. The third task took 10 minutes and 40
seconds to complete.
The vertical entry task was to teleoperate the two Inuktun robots down a hallway,
through a hole in a wall, into a room with a hole in the floor, enter the lower floor through
the hole, and search it. The MicroVGTV (lead) robot was used to explore while the
MicroTracs robot provided an external view of other robot’s progress. The task took
approximately 30 minutes.
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The experimental method1 includes a workflow analysis of the fire professionals
utilizing robots in the specified USAR tasks, and informal interviews. The workflow was
recorded using four synchronized cameras to record four different aspects of the tasks
performed. The four viewpoints videotaped were: the operator and control unit, the robot,
the fire rescue professionals within the vicinity of the operator, and an additional
viewpoint which varied by task.
Field notes were used to record the start and end times, and any interesting events
(e.g. failures) which occurred during the tasks. The estimated location, test environment
status, and weather conditions were also recorded. Informal discussions took place with
the participating fire professionals and operators after each task, and post-excursion
meeting included the individuals who video taped and observed the events. Relevant
comments and suggestions from both were recorded.
4.5.2 Summary of Results
The HCFRD study [10] found that the human to robot ratio for teleoperated robots was
often 2:1 (two humans to one robot) and 3:2 at best. It was the first of several studies
(see [4]) to find evidence of a heavy cognitive load associated with teleoperating a small
robot, with limited sensing capabilities, in a USAR environment. In this study the robot
operator drove by a live victim in plain view, while concentrating on navigating the robot
through the environment. The fire rescue personnel served as a second pair of eyes,
focused on the traditional search task including looking for structural hazards and victims,
as well as keeping track of the area covered.
The most common errors were collisions, in which the robot collided with some
obstacle, followed by communication failures with the wireless Urban platform. One
1Approved by the Internal Research Board (IRB) for human subjects.
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navigation error during the stair climbing task was mentioned. In this case, the operator let
the robot slip down one stair when he misinterpreted a cue in the camera view.
As with the WTC studies (see Section 4.3), the source for the data from the
HCFRD study [10] was not available. Therefore the statistics presented in Chapter Five
are taken directly or derived from the published study. Derived statistics were generated
using the methods described in detail in Chapter Three.
4.6 CRASAR Reliability Studies
CRASAR currently has twenty-one robots from six manufacturers, and spends more than
200 hours per year in the field. In addition to the published studies already mentioned in
Sections 4.3 and 4.5, CRASAR has also documented its experience using manual logging.
Over the past three years this has produced a reasonable database of mobile robot physical
failures and their characteristics. Two studies have been produced from this database.
CRASAR’s original reliability study [6] analyzed failure and usage data collected during
the first two years, including information on 13 robots representing three manufacturers
and seven models. The follow-up reliability study [7] expanded on the first with an
additional year’s worth of data, two more robots, and a statistical analysis of the results.
The studies were not limited to field environments, but included usage and failures
which occurred in the lab as well. The failure data were analyzed using standard
manufacturing measures for the reliability of a product, like mean time between failures
and availability. The relative frequency of the physical classes were also determined. The
original study’s results showed an average mean time between failures (MTBF) of 8 hours
(6 for field robots) and availability of less than 50% (64% for field robots). The follow-up
study revealed that MTBF had improved by a factor of three (24 hours) but that
availability remained low and the gulf between the reliability of indoor research (used
only in the lab and similar office style environments) and field robots had widened. In the
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original study, the effectors were the most common sources of failures (42%) for field
robots. The control system was the most frequent source of failures at 32% in the
follow-up study. For the purposes of this meta-study only field (including both office and
USAR domains) use and failures were considered.
4.6.1 Approach
User and failure logs served as the sources of data for this analysis. A total of 171 failures
were recorded over a period of three years, specifically June 21, 2000 through January 10,
2003. Prior to February 2002 informal records were kept, including changes to the robots
and information about ongoing repairs. Starting in February 2002 formal failure and user
logs were kept. The user logs were entered by robot operators and the failure logs were
recorded by the individual who performed the repair. Since then over 2100 hours of usage
have been logged, including 500 hours of field work. The following information was
gathered for quantitative analysis: which robot was involved, who repaired it, the date the
failure was discovered, the date the failure was fixed, the total repair time, which
component failed, where the failure occurred, and where the repair was performed.
Chapter Three describes in detail how this information was analyzed. A brief synopsis is
provided here.
The source of the failure was categorized as effector, sensor, control system, power,
or communications. Human failures in the follow-up study are divided into mistakes and
slips. A failure’s repairability was considered to be field-repairable or
non-field-repairable. Since the usage and failure logs covered both lab and field events, a
distinction was made between data which came from the lab versus from the field. Lab
usage and failures occurred in the lab. Field usage and failures occurred outside of the lab,
usually during demos, outdoor testing, or training sessions.
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Standard formulas taken from [24] were used to convert the raw data into common
reliability metrics. The statistical analysis performed in the follow-up study consisted of
calculating the confidence intervals for the mean-based and the probability-based results.
The mean-based results were analyzed using the standard equation (7) for the 95%
confidence interval where m represents the sample mean. Confidence intervals for the
probability-based results were similarly calculated using equation (8) where s represents
the sample probability.
m− 1.96
√∑
x−m
n
≤ µ ≤ m+ 1.96
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x−m
n
(7)
s− 1.96
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s(1− s)
n
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4.6.2 Summary of Results
Table 13 summarizes the general findings from the data collected for the reliability
studies [6][7]. Here, we consider only the portion of data (usage and failure records)
generated in each platform’s target environment, grouped by manufacturer. For the
Nomad indoor research robots (see Figure 14), only in-lab data was included. For the
Inuktuns and iRobot models only field usage and failures were used. The platform type
(field versus indoor research), percentage of usage in the target environment over all the
recorded usage, and the mean time between failures (MTBF) are included to describe the
overall frequency of failures. Availability and average downtime are included to show the
impact of failures. Note that the MTBF does not include idle time (see Section 3.3).
Table 13 shows that MTBF by itself does not paint a complete picture. For
example, the overall MTBF for Inuktun and iRobot in the original reliability study [6]
were the same, but availability is quite different. The primary reason for this is that the
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Table 13. Summary of Results from the CRASAR Reliability Studies [6][7]. Research
refers to platforms suited for indoor research only.
Manu. Type % of Usage MTBF(hrs) Availability Ave. Downtime(hrs)
Inuktun Field 94% 6.14 90% 177
iRobot Field 28% 6.27 36% 207
Nomad Research 100% 19.50 94% 61
Inuktun Field 80% 10.27 27% 39.65
iRobot Field 24% 4.57 88% 0.66
Nomad Research 94% 149.08 99% 0.3
Figure 14. A Nomad Research Robot Included in the CRASAR Reliability Studies. Plat-
forms like these which are designed for indoor research only cannot handle field conditions
and are therefore excluded from the results presented in Chapter Five.
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Inuktun robots tended to suffer from minor failures in the first two years, which often took
less than a minute to fix. The iRobot platforms were more likely to suffer from serious
failures that took hours to repair. In the follow-up reliability study [7] the opposite was
true. The iRobot models encountered failures more frequently in the field but had a much
higher availability rate. This is due to the fact that the failures were easier to repair, based
on an average downtime of 40 minutes compared to Inuktun’s nearly 40 hour average
downtime.
In comparison to the original study, the gulf between field and indoor robots
increased dramatically in the follow-up study. This appears to be due to the innovative
capabilities of these robots, and the inherent difficulty in constructing robots which can
operate in unstructured, outdoor environments. Robots manufactured by iRobot in
particular had a much lower MTBF in the field compared to their combined field and lab
MTBF (almost 16 hours). The likely reason for this is that field environments are more
challenging. Another reason is that the less reliable iRobot platforms were used more
often in the field then the less fragile (but larger) platforms and that only 28% of iRobot
usage was in the field. In the follow-up study, therefore, the more reliable platforms had a
better chance of influencing the overall results.
The overall MTBF from the follow-up study improved by almost a factor of three
from the original analysis results. Since only a year had passed, and the majority of robots
were examined by both studies, it is unlikely that this resulted from an actual improvement
in the reliability of the robots themselves. Instead, an additional year’s worth of usage logs
provided better records (and subsequently better estimates) of the robots’ behavior. The
statistical analysis showed that the time between failures, the time to repair, and the
downtime vary widely therefore none of the differences between related means can be
considered to be reliable predictors for future failures. Regardless, they do provide a good
summary of the information found in the logs and a general assessment of robot reliability.
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4.7 Summary
This Chapter has provided a detailed description of the information examined in this
thesis. Thirteen studies from two primary sources, five from CRASAR and eight from
TECO [42], were described in detail. These include the CRASAR’s WTC [34][8],
HCFRD [10], and reliability studies [6][7], as well as TECO’s studies [59] [55] [3] [14]
[13] [44] [62] [43].
The chapter began with a description of the total of 28 robots considered in this
thesis. They represent 15 different models from seven manufacturers and range from
small (less than 10 pounds) tracked vehicles capable of changing their geometry, to a
modified M1 tank (over 60 tonnes). Then in Section 4.2, an overview of the information
available from each study was provided. This section revealed that key information (the
definition of failure used, data collection methods, and numeric results) is missing from
most of TECO’s studies [42]. It also showed that the reliability studies [6][7] and the
WTC studies [34][8] differed in both data collection and result generation methods.
Therefore, a true comparative study could not be performed directly on this set of studies.
The goal for this meta-study was to gather as much information as it could from the
material available, and use that information to develop a standard method for collecting
and analyzing mobile robot failure information. The taxonomy presented in Section 3.2 is
the result of that effort.
Section 4.3 covered the two studies generated from a post-hoc analysis of data
collected during the robot-assisted search and rescue response at the WTC. A detailed
analysis on the failures encountered while using robots was reported in the WTC
Engineering study [34]. The WTC Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) study [8] examined
the human-robot interaction and human-human interaction between the robots, their
operators, and the other USAR professionals that worked with CRASAR at the WTC
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response. The data examined span a period of nine days between September 12th and 21st
of 2001, and four robots from two manufacturers representing three different models.
According to [34] minor failures occurred 2.8 times per minute. On average 11% of the
search time was lost due to traction slippage, 18% due to camera occlusion, and 6% due to
lighting adjustments. The WTC HRI study [8] found that CRASAR personnel were
cognitively fatigued mainly due to lack of sleep. It was also determined that none of the
robots used at the WTC were designed or rated for use in USAR, and that two types of vital
information were not getting from the robot to the operator: the state of the robot, and the
state of the robot’s environment.
In Sec 4.4, TECO’s eight studies were described. These studies were performed on
a wide variety of platforms: small mobile platforms, several bulldozers, and a modified
M1 tank. Experiments were carried out in mock military operations which can be
considered to be high-fidelity field environments. TECO has reported a mean time
between failures (MTBF) of less than 20 hours, though their studies did not provide
enough information to validate that figure. During the 32 day period of the
PANTHER [13] experiments, a total of 35 failures were reported. Most (94%) of the
failures were terminal. The average downtime was 7.31 hours overall, or 7.75 hours
excluding non-terminal failures.
Section 4.5 covers CRASAR’s field study with the Hillsborough County Fire
Rescue Department (HCFRD). The purpose of the study was to simulate the use of robots
with a real rescue team responding to an incident, and to collect human-robot interaction
(HRI) data. The data collected during the field excursion included approximately eight
hours of video, two sets of field notes, and summaries of informal interviews with the fire
professionals and post-excursion meetings. This study found that the human to robot ratio
for teleoperated robots was often 2:1 (two humans to one robot) and 3:2 at best. The most
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common errors were collisions, in which the robot collided with some obstacle, followed
by communication failures with the wireless Urban platform.
The reliability studies [6][7] were described in Section 4.6. These studies
examined CRASAR’s database of manually logged usage and failure records over the past
three years. The original reliability study [6] analyzed failure and usage data collected
during the first two years, including information on 13 robots representing three
manufacturers and seven models. The follow-up reliability study [7] expanded on the first
with an additional year’s worth of data, two more robots, and a statistical analysis of the
results. The original study’s findings showed an average MTBF of 8 hours (6 for field
robots) and availability of less than 50% (64% for field robots). In the follow-up study, the
MTBF had improved to 24 hours but that availability remained low and the gulf between
the reliability of indoor research (used only in the lab and similar office style
environments) and field robots had widened. In the original study, the effectors were the
most common sources of failures (42%) for field robots. The control system was the most
frequent source of failures at 32% in the follow-up study. For the purposes of this
meta-study only field (including both office and USAR domains) use and failures were
considered.
Though more source data and details were available for the reliability
studies [6][7] than the others, and only three of the studies were focused on mobile robot
failures; all have contributed valuable examples and insights into how mobile robots fail in
the field. Their contributions have produced 44 representative examples (listed in
Appendix B) of mobile robot field failures, and enabled the creation of the framework for
future robot failure analyses presented in Chapter Three.
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Chapter Five
Meta-Study Results
This chapter examines the mobile robot failures reported in 13 studies of field work in the
application areas of urban search and rescue (USAR) and military operations in urban
terrain (MOUT). Results and findings from these studies were not gathered under the
same conditions (see Section 4.2) and for this reason cannot be synthesized into a single
set of metrics which describe mobile robot failures in the field. This chapter therefore
explores representative examples (44 total) which demonstrate how mobile robot failures
can be classified using the taxonomy presented in Chapter Three, and the challenges
associated with using robots in field environments, comparing numeric results whenever
possible. For a complete description of every example included see Appendix B.
This chapter’s organization follows the mobile robot failure taxonomy presented in
Chapter Three exactly. This taxonomy uses classes to capture the source of the failure
which can be either physical (system or robot) covered in Section 5.1, or human examined
in Section 5.2. For each branch, the relative frequency of the classes under the branch and
the examples which fall into each of those classes are included. This is true of all of the
leaf classes in the taxonomy with the exception of the design failure class, which none of
the 13 studies explored. The taxonomy also includes two attributes, examined in
Section 5.1.7, to describe the severity of the failure in terms of its repairability and impact
on the robot’s mission at the time of the failure. Any information gathered from the source
studies which relates to these attributes is included in this section.
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5.1 Physical Failures
This section covers in detail the failures reported in the 13 studies this meta-study
examines which do not directly involve a human (that is, physical failures). Taken as a
whole, the vast majority of failures found in the studies fall under the physical branch.
Since details on each individual failure encountered at the World Trade Center (WTC) was
not available (see Section 4.2), the failures are presented by category as defined in the
WTC Engineering study [34] performed by the Center for Robot-Assisted Search and
Rescue (CRASAR). These were: stuck assist, gravity assist, track slippage, occluded
camera, and lighting incorrect. Chapter Four provides detailed definitions of these
categories. Each reported failure from CRASAR’s reliability studies [6][7] and the studies
performed by the Test and Evaluation Coordination Office (TECO) at Fort Leonard Wood
[42] were individually classified. Both the CRASAR WTC HRI study [8] and CRASAR’s
field experiments with the Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department (HCFRD) [10]
were focused on human-robot interaction (HRI) issues, therefore their data are not
covered in this section.
First the frequency of failures within the classes that fall under the physical failure
branch of the taxonomy are presented in Section 5.1.1. In Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.6,
examples of failures which fall into each category are provided. Each of these sections
will also include some discussion of general traits of that physical failure class.
5.1.1 Relative Frequency of Physical Classes
Table 14 presents data from the reliability analyses described in Section 4.6. It shows the
relative frequency of each of the physical classes in the form of probabilities that a failure
was caused by component(s) from each class. The reliability studies [6][7] covered
day-to-day usage and failures in both lab and field environments. Therefore, it is
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Table 14. Probability by Physical Class from the Reliability Studies [6][7]. Results from
the original study appear above with the follow-up study’s results below.
Manufacturer Effector Control System Power Comms Sensing
Inuktun 0.50 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.13
iRobot 0.58 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.00
Overall 0.50 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.09
Inuktun 0.45 0.32 0.00 0.02 0.12
iRobot 0.22 0.30 0.15 0.22 0.11
Overall 0.36 0.31 0.06 0.10 0.12
important to note that this information was taken from the source data1 for both the
studies, rather than the studies themselves. All usage and failure events recorded in the lab
were factored out of the statistics reported here. The failures are grouped by manufacturer
with the overall probabilities for each class provided at the bottom of the table. Since
sufficient descriptions of all the failures encountered in TECO’s M1 PANTHER II
study [13] was provided, a similar table, Table 15, was created for that study as well.
Figure 15 was generated from results from the follow-up reliability study [7]
including the statistical analysis. As in the previous table the failures are grouped by
manufacturer with overall probabilities for each category shown in the right-most set. The
probabilities are shown as bars with the 95% confidence intervals from the statistical
analysis indicated. The difference between effector and control system relative
frequencies is significant only if a 50% or less confidence interval is used. Both are
significantly more common than the other categories.
Table 14 shows that effectors are the most common source of physical failures,
followed by the control system, sensors, communications, and power. Table 15 for the
PANTHER shows very different results. In TECO’s study the primary problem was a new
teleoperation system installed on the modified tank. This resulted in a high percentage of
control system failures. The sensors that came with the control system were second, with
1Database of usage and failure logs entered by the operator and repairer resp.
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Figure 15. Probability by Physical Class from the Follow-up Reliability Study [7].
Table 15. Probability by Physical Class for M1 PANTHER [13].
Model Effector Control System Power Comms Sensing
PANTHER 0.11 0.54 0.09 0.00 0.26
26% of the failures, followed by the effectors. Only power has a similar probability of
causing failures across the three studies. The difference is probably due to the maturity of
the M1 Tank platform, which has been used by the US Army for 20 years. In comparison,
the platforms examined in the reliability studies were less than 10 years old.
5.1.2 Effector
The most common type of failure across the 11 studies which explored physical failures
was failure of components that perform actuation and their connections, or effector
failures. Common failure sources in the original reliability study [6] were the shear pin
and pinion gear in the geometry shifting mechanism on the MicroVGTV. If the robot
encounters resistance while shifting (low clearance in a confined space for example) the
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Figure 16. Dirt Found Near Sensitive Equipment Inside an iRobot Urban.
shear pin will break. The pinion gear is a problem because the area that houses it is open
to the environment. Dirt and other debris get inside that area and cause premature wear.
According to TECO, the Urban platform suffers from similar problems [43]. Open
gearing for the articulating arms and drive motor collect debris which causes them to stop
working. These examples illustrate a commonly found source of problems for field robots,
namely dirt and other small debris. These particles have been shown to appear in every
unsealed area inside a mobile robot (see Figure 16).
Results from the reliability studies [6][7] show that tracked vehicles were more
prone to effector failure than wheeled platforms. In the original reliability study [6] 96%
of the effector failures occurred on tracked rather than wheeled vehicles. 57% of the
effector failures were the tracks working off their wheels (known as de-tracking), usually
due to excessive friction with the ground surface. The Urban Robot study [43] described
the same problem with the Urbans used in their field experiments. The study of the
ARTS vehicle performed by TECO [59] mentioned two instances in which rocks became
stuck in the track guides and sprockets (see Figure 17). The PANTHER also threw a track,
a failure which took days to repair. Several of the studies, the WTC studies [34][8],
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Figure 17. Rock Stuck in ARTS Track Mechanism. Photo taken from ARTS study. [59]
TECO’s D-7G study [3], and TECO’s DEUCE study [14], mentioned repeated problems
with track slippage.
The track slippage category defined in the WTC Engineering study [34] was used
to catalog the amount of time the tracks were spinning while the robot remained in place.
The tracks were often slipping on piles of loose sand or paper, a problem which the
effectors on a small tracked vehicle that weighs less than 10 pounds cannot easily
overcome. Therefore only situations in which the tracks should have had enough friction
with the ground surface under those conditions, would be considered to be an effector
failure. The WTC Engineering study [34] do not provide sufficiently detailed descriptions
of the failures themselves to determine what percentage of the track slippage time would
meet this criteria. Two failures from the WTC do clearly fall into the effector category. In
one documented case, the void a robot was exploring exceeded 122 degrees Fahrenheit
and softened the track enough that it became loose and fell off. In another case, an
aluminum rod became lodged into the track mechanism on a MicroTracs robot where the
space tolerance between the track and the platform was less than one-eighth of an inch
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Figure 18. Failure Encountered at the WTC.
(see Figure 18). These are classified as terminal failures, as the robots had to be pulled out
of the void and repaired before being used again.
Effector failures include more than just mobility failures. For example, TECO’s
DEUCE study [14] mentioned problems with the ripper appendage mounted to the robot.
The tool gets bogged down when used in particularly hard rock. TECO’s M1 PANTHER
II study [13] described problems with its hydraulic system which manifested as smoke
issuing from the tank’s turret.
5.1.3 Sensor
The sensor category covers failed sensors and problems with their connections. These
failures tend to be less common than effector and control system failures, with only 9% of
the failures analyzed in the original reliability study [6] and 11% of failures in TECO’s
M1 PANTHER II study [13]. At the WTC sensors were more of a problem. Due to
incorrect lighting and occluded camera views, an average of 24% of search time was lost
each time the robot was used to search a void [34]. By far the most common failed sensor
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in all of the studies was the camera. It was also the only sensor common to all of the
robots’ sensor suites.
Sensors were the most rare source of failures in the original reliability study [6],
and tied with the Power class for least common in the follow-up reliability study [7]. The
most common source of sensor failures in these studies was the sensor’s connection to the
control system. Note that this does not include problems in the smaller robots’ tether or
the larger robots’ wireless connection, as those failures would fall under the
communications class. Examples include faulty cabling and broken or loose connections
at either end of the cabling. Statistical analysis in the follow-up reliability study [7] shows
that these failures are equally uncommon across all the robot models examined in that
study.
The WTC Engineering study [34] identified two categories of intermittent sensor
failures: occluded camera and incorrect lighting. Occluded camera was defined as a state
in which the entire camera view is blocked by obstacles. This failure was found to occur
during 18%, on average, of the total time the robots spent searching a void. Note that this
percentage is high despite the fact that 100% obstruction was required. The lighting
incorrect category included states in which the lights were completely off (in which case
the operator could not see) or were in transition between intensities. This failure was less
common, occurring 6%, on average, of the total time the robots spent searching. Lighting
problems were also mentioned in TECO’s ARTS study [59]. The camera’s automatic iris
did not adjust enough for the operator to see to maneuver the robot.
TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13] cited sensor problems which do not tend to
occur under lab conditions. Bumpy terrain, sudden changes in lighting, and rainy weather
caused problems for the on-board cameras. Since human operators rely heavily on camera
views while teleoperating a robot [10] these minor failures made it difficult to control the
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robot from the remote operator control unit (OCU). The PANTHER study also mentions
cases where camera lenses were covered in moisture, dirt, or mud.
5.1.4 Control System
The control system failure class includes any problems caused by the on-board computer,
manufacturer provided software, and OCUs. They were the most common failures in
TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13] (54%), and the second most common field failures
in both the reliability studies [6][7]. None were reported in the WTC Engineering
study [34]. In TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13] more than 6 days of the 32 available
for testing were lost due to diagnosis and maintenance of the teleoperation system.
The most frequent control system failures in the original reliability study [6] were
cases in which the robot was simply unresponsive (60% of field control system failures)
and the solution was to cycle the power. Since rebooting the robot and/or OCU solved the
problem, it was assumed that the problem was due to the control system. By the time of
the follow-up reliability study [7], the control system failures had become more serious.
The most common problem became an overload of the electrical system either on the
robot or within the OCU which cycling power could not fix. In each case the robot or
OCU had to be dismantled to replace either a fuse or a burnt component. These problems
occur as frequently in the lab as they do in the field.
TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13] reported a wider variety of control system
failures. The steering system was the most frequent source of problems. Symptoms
ranged from sluggishness to a complete loss of steering, sometimes manifesting in only
one direction at a time. The emergency stop switch failed multiple times. The
PANTHER’s control system behavior was erratic and unstable in some cases. Reported
failures include: uncontrolled acceleration, the RPMs shooting up to a critical level for no
apparent reason, and a system shutdown when the operator tried to switch to teleoperation
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mode. TECO’s UGVROP study [62] described similar problems with the same
teleoperation system, but they appeared to be less frequent.
5.1.5 Power
Based on the results from the reliability studies [6][7] and TECO’s M1 PANTHER II
study [13], power failures do not produce many of the failures that occur in the field. The
WTC Engineering study [34] revealed no failures due to batteries and their related
connections during the two week rescue response. This was probably due to the fact that
the robots were not used for an extended period of time. The longest period of time a
robot was continuously used was a little over 24 minutes, therefore the batteries were not
heavily taxed. Power may be more reliable than the other systems since it is the least
affected by environmental hazards.
In the reliability studies [6][7] half of the power failures on the robots are due to
the battery and its connections. The PANTHER platform suffered repeatedly from low
batteries and low fuel. TECO had recurring failures during the DEUCE study [14]. One of
the two DEUCE platforms suffered from clogged fuel filters, requiring a replacement
roughly every six hours.
5.1.6 Communications
The majority of communications failures in the field were found and described by TECO,
with the WTC Engineering study [34] providing one example (a robot was lost due to
complete communications dropout). This is due in part to the fact that wireless
communications is a known problem in field environments [34][10]. Wired robots are
more commonly used (94% of Inuktun usage was in the field [6]) then the larger wireless
robots (28% of usage in the field). CRASAR therefore encountered fewer communications
failures in the field due to the use of relatively reliable wired communication. TECO did
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not have this luxury. Most of the robots they examined could only use wireless
communications and none had a durable tether, like those used with the Inuktuns.
Experience with the wireless SOLEM platform at the WTC [34] provides a good
example of why these robots are difficult to use remotely in field environments. The
structural steel of the World Trade Center had a significant impact on the range of the 2
watt transmitter the platform was carrying. Instead of the usual mile or more, the robot
lost communication with the OCU in under 20 feet. Even up to that point the signal was
not very stable, 23.8% of the 7 minutes the robot spent searching the rubble pile resulted
in completely useless video due to wireless dropout. The robot finally completely lost
contact with the OCU. It was never recovered.
Similar problems may have been found with the PANTHER platform tested by
TECO [13]. 14% of the failures encountered during that study were due to video dropout,
a good indication of communications failures. TECO’s D-7G study [3] concluded that the
non-line-of-sight control requirement for the platform could not be met. This was because
the teleoperation equipment could not transmit video through interposed materials or
foliage. Video bandwidth and reliability limitations even impacted the performance of
operators in line-of-sight scenarios. Occasional static was a problem for ARTS operators
as well [59]. In the study conducted by TECO on the smaller mobile robot platforms (the
Urban robot study), additional antennas were used in an attempt to improve the quality of
the video signal. The analog signal was described as being adequate but was breaking-up
often enough to distract the operators from the test scenario.
If communication technology improves, new problems are likely to emerge. For
example, the problem of sharing limited bandwidth among many wireless robots in the
same area. Limited bandwidth is already a problem for the military, where rules on
allowed frequencies were found by TECO [59] to be a hindrance to improved signal
strength and reliability. It is also a challenge to ensure that wireless transmitters adhere to
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Table 16. Comparison of Terminal Versus Non-terminal Failures from the M1 Panther
Study [13].
Impact # Average Diagnosis Time(hrs) Average Downtime(hrs)
Terminal 33 0.33 7.75
Non-terminal 2 12.50 0
Overall 35 1.02 7.31
the established rules. The ARTS for example would bleed over to radio frequencies it was
not allowed to use.
5.1.7 Attributes
In the taxonomy defined in Chapter Three two additional characteristics of physical
failures were defined in addition to the cause (or fault) of the failure: the repairability of
the failure and the impact of the failure. First the impact attribute is explored in
Section 5.1.7.1, followed by the repairability attribute in Sec 5.1.7.2. Each section will
discuss key traits of the attributes based on any data available from the 13 studies.
5.1.7.1 Impact. The impact of a failure is specified by the terms terminal and
non-terminal. It is determined based on the effect the failure had on the robot’s assigned
task or mission at the time of the failure. Since information on the robot’s mission was not
consistently recorded for the reliability analyses [6][7], the largest source of documented
failures in this meta-study could not be used to describe the traits of this attribute. Instead,
TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13] provided sufficient information to reliably
distinguish between terminal and non-terminal failures. Table 16 shows the number of
terminal versus non-terminal failures, and the average diagnosis time and downtime for
each type. Overall results are provided at the bottom of the table.
Table 16 shows that terminal failures were far more common. The average
diagnosis time shows that intermittent non-terminal failures tend to require more
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Table 17. Comparison of Field-repaired vs. Not Field-repaired Failures. Results from the
original study appear above with the follow-up study’s results below.
Repairability % MTBF(hrs) Average Downtime(hrs)
Field-repaired 65% 9.5 0.14
Non-field-repaired 35% 17.7 553
Overall 6.17 185
Field-repaired 60% 12.90 0.16
Non-field-repaired 40% 32.06 50.91
Overall 12.23 22.49
diagnosis time and additional technical knowledge of the robotic system. For example, an
unresponsive control system may take less than a minute to diagnose and fix (power
cycle). This is still considered to be a terminal failure as the robot cannot continue its
mission until it is repaired. A non-terminal, but still significant steering problem may
degrade the operators’ performance and reduce the safety level of operation (especially for
a vehicle as large as the PANTHER) for an extended period of time.
5.1.7.2 Repairability. Since this meta-study is concerned with field mobile robot
failures, repairability is defined in terms of field-repairability (see Chapter Three).
Table 17 compares the rates of physical failures that were field-repaired and those that
were not using only only data collected in the field from the reliability studies [6][7]. The
table presents the percentage of failures, MTBF’s, and average downtime for
field-repaired and non-field-repaired failures. Average downtime is the average amount of
time between the occurrence of the failure and the completion of the repair that fixed it.
Based on Table 17, field failures are more likely to be repaired in the field than in
the lab. This result has remained stable despite the increase in the MTBF and the drop in
average downtime overall between the two studies. The average downtime for field
repaired failures has also remained low compared to those that were not field repaired.
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5.2 Human Failures
This section covers the human branch of the taxonomy presented in Chapter Three using
human failures that emerged from the WTC studies [34][8], the HCFRD study [10], the
reliability studies [6][7], and TECO’s studies [42]. Design failures were not explored by
any of the 13 studies, therefore this section is limited to interaction failures. As mentioned
by Laprie in [30], all failures can eventually be traced to a human error at some level. This
section covers only direct (or if not direct at least important) connections between human
error and the failures that resulted from them. Section 5.2.1 explores the relative
frequency of classes within and interaction branch and Section 5.2.2 provides examples of
human-robot interaction failures.
This section will present results from a smaller set of recorded human failures as
compared to the physical failures covered in Section 5.1. The reliability studies [6][7] and
the WTC Engineering study [34] were focused on physical rather then human-robot
interaction (HRI) failures. While an objective of TECO’s studies was an assessment of the
robotic system’s usability, none of their studies included formal HRI experiments. Both
the WTC HRI study [8] and the HCFRD study [10] were focused on HRI issues in USAR,
not failures and therefore provide a more limited set of recorded examples.
5.2.1 Relative Frequency of Human Classes
Table 18 isolates the human failures described in the HCFRD study [10] and the WTC
studies [34][8] and categorizes them based on the taxonomy presented in Chapter Three.
The field event and the task the operator was asked to perform with the robot are included.
Table 18 also includes the total duration of that task, total number of failures, mean time
between failures (MTBF, see Chapter Three) in hours, percentage of mistakes, and
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Table 18. Human Failure Analysis Results.
Field Event Task Time(min) # MTBF(hrs) Mistakes Slips
HCFRD[10] Climb Stairs 24 3 0.13 33% 67%
WTC[8][34] Search Small Voids 55 16+ 0.06 38% 63%
Overall 79 19 0.28 37% 63%
percentage of slips. The results are broken down by event with overall values provided at
the bottom.
It is also important to note that, for 13 of the WTC failures reported here, the
duration was recorded rather then the number of individual failures. More specifically, the
six mistakes were from failures categorized as incorrect lighting (see Section 4.3), and
seven of the slips were from the track slippage category. For the purposes of this
meta-study, each duration value recorded was considered to be a single failure. Therefore,
the number of failures reported here represents the minimum that actually occurred.
Table 18 shows that human failures occurred more often during the actual USAR
response at the WTC as compared to the field experiments. This result is expected
considering the difficulty of navigating a collapse site as extensive and compact as the
WTC disaster (see Figure 19), compounded by fatigue and risk to personal safety. The
ratio of mistakes to slips is similar despite these differences. More data is needed to
determine if this is a universal attribute of HRI.
5.2.2 Interaction
The interaction category captures all of the failures caused at the human end of HRI. For
mobile robots this means failures caused by the robot’s operators, as well as any
secondary and tertiary stakeholders who may be directing the operator’s actions [10].
Both mistakes, or cognitive errors, covered in Section 5.2.2.1 and slips, or unconscious
errors, described in Section 5.2.2.2 fall under this category.
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Figure 19. Comparing WTC Working Conditions to that of the HCFRD Study. Image taken
at the WTC disaster (left). A Microtracs and MicroVGTV cooperatively navigating a small
pile of debris at the HCFRD study (right).
5.2.2.1 Mistakes. In the WTC Engineering study [34] many of the failures could be
categorized as mistakes, where the operator was planning his actions based on incomplete
knowledge. It is difficult for any human to maintain a cognitive model of the environment
the robot is in with only a single color camera (with a limited field of view) and 2-way
audio. An operator who is physically and cognitively fatigued (for instance due to
perceived threats to personal safety) will have more problems. Gravity assists for
example, may have occurred when the operator drove the robot into an area where the
incline was too steep for it, because he could not judge the vertical orientation of the void.
Other examples would be stuck assists needed when the operator lost track of the
obstacles around the robot, and occluded camera when he did not know which way to go
to get around the obstacle blocking its view. Some of the time spent in the incorrect
lighting failure mode was definitely due to mistakes on the operator’s part. He was trying
to improve the camera view of the void by adjusting the robot’s halogen lights, but at the
same time the camcorder was automatically adjusting to the new conditions. The operator
knew about this feature of the camcorder, but did not immediately realize what was
happening.
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Figure 20. ARTS on its Side After a Fall. Photo taken from ARTS study. [59]
A sensor impoverished robot can lead to deficits in an awareness of the state of the
robot, as well as the environment. In one example described by TECO the operators
attempted to drive the ARTS up a 30% slope [59]. The platform became unstable and the
operators could not recover in time to prevent the robot from rolling on its side (see
Figure 20). TECO’s SARGE study [44] noted navigation errors (positioning and driving)
made by the operators due to the difficulty of judging distance and position. The study
explicitly blamed these problems on the fact that the installed camera did not provide
adequate peripheral vision or depth perception.
It is important to note here that the WTC studies [34][8] and TECO in three
separate studies specifically cited the lack of depth perception as a problem encountered in
the field. This appears to be an important feature lacking in current sensor suites. It occurs
regardless of the payload capability or the location of the camera, as the ARTS vehicle is
considerably larger than the robots used at the WTC. The difference in payload
capabilities led TECO to recommend using additional cameras, whereas the WTC study
recommended software and/or cognitive science-based solutions.
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Undetected physical failures can also lead to human mistakes. TECO also had
problems with the Urban platform [43] due to the fact that the operators did not recognize
that the drive system was frozen, and would overtax the power system in a vain effort to
get the robot to move. Even experienced operators who are not intimately familiar with
the capabilities of a robotics platform may overestimate them, causing additional failures.
An example of such a mistake from the reliability studies [6][7] was when an operator
attempted to use an ATRV-Jr to push a heavy load up a hill. This resulted in a blown motor
amplifier which immobilized the robot. A similar case with inexperienced operators was
mentioned in TECO’s DEUCE study [14]. The operator tried to steer the robot with the
rippers embedded in rock, not realizing that this action would bend the tool.
5.2.2.2 Slips. The halogen lights failure [34] at the WTC was a good example of a slip.
In this case the halogen lights failed due to an energy spike when the robot’s tether was
removed and then reconnected to the OCU. The operator who caused this failure knew the
potential problems of plugging electrical components back together while one is still
powered. He probably intended to turn off the OCU, just in case, but due to distractions
and/or fatigue did not do so.
Minor slips can occur frequently when operators do not have enough experience
with a particular robot system. Two examples from the reliability studies [6][7] would be
a joystick that was dropped in sand; and a tether that was not properly connected to the
OCU. In both cases the operators had learned enough about the platforms to understand
how to use them properly, but did not have a lot of practice.
All of the slips mentioned so far are not unique to mobile robots used in field
environments. These types of human error are common features of human-computer
interaction (HCI) or even just man-machine interaction. Certain aspects of HRI, especially
in field environments, lead to additional mistakes and slips not commonly found in other
fields. For example, a distinct attribute of teleoperation (controlling the robot from a
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remote location) is that it removes the operator from the environment of the robot. In
TECO’s Urban Robot study [43] the operator would often drive the robot dangerously
close to suspicious objects in order to determine if they were mines, grenades, or some
other harmful device. If the soldiers had been there in place of the robot they probably
would have acted more cautiously. Similar teleoperation slips from the HCFRD
study [10] included two collisions with walls as the operator was trying to navigate a robot
up a flight of stairs.
5.3 Summary
This chapter has reported example field failures and relevant findings from 13 studies of
field work with mobile robots in the application areas of USAR and MOUT. The examples
demonstrate how mobile robot failures can be classified using the novel mobile robot
failure taxonomy presented in Chapter Three, and the challenges associated with using
robots in field environments. Numeric results were compared whenever possible. The
chapter’s organization followed the taxonomy. Section 5.1 covered the physical failures,
Section 5.2 explored the human-robot interaction (HRI) failures, and Section 5.1.7
presented data on the repairability and impact attributes.
Figure 21 provides a summary of the findings in terms of the taxonomy presented
in Chapter Three. The probability that a given failure belongs to a given class is displayed
beneath that class (leaf node) in the taxonomy tree. If multiple source studies provided
data, the probability is shown as a range. Design failures (under human failures) were not
explored by the 13 studies this meta-study drew from, and therefore no probability is
included for this class. Ideally the probabilities of siblings should sum to 1.0 but since
they are extracted from multiple sources, that is not always the case.
As seen in Figure 21, the effectors and the control system are the most common
sources of failures, with at most half of the failures falling into one of these classes.
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Figure 21. Summary of Classification Results Using the Failure Taxonomy. Includes prob-
abilities for each leaf class and attribute value. For example, the probability that a failure
was an effector failure is at least .11 and at most .5 (depending on the source) and the
probability that the failure will be field repairable is between 0.60 and 0.65.
Sensor failures are less frequent with at most 26% of the failures, followed by power at
9%, and communications failures at 1%. Though communications failures appear to be
the least frequent, it should be noted that several of TECO’s studies, which did not provide
enough details to derive relative frequencies, reported chronic communications problems.
Within the human failures branch, slips are more common with at most 67% of the failures
while mistakes contributed no more than 38% of the failures examined. Since the physical
and human failure results came from different sources, the relative frequency of physical
versus human failures cannot be determined from these studies. The reliability analyses
show that the MTBF for mobile robots in the field is between 6 and 12 hours. TECO
reported that the robots they examined failed within 20 hours of use [56], though their
studies did not provide enough information (see Chapter Four) to validate that figure.
The attributes are similarly marked with the probability that a given failure will
have that attribute value. Field-repairable and terminal failures are more common than
their opposites, with up to 65% and 94% respectively of the failures covered in this
meta-study. The studies did not provide sufficient data to calculate conditional
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probabilities between the classes and attributes, for example, the probability that a given
effector failure will be terminal or field-repairable.
A detailed examination of the field failures described in the 13 studies uncovered
the following common issues:
1. unstable control systems
2. chassis and effectors designed and tested for a narrow range of environmental
conditions
3. limited wireless communication range in urban environments
4. insufficient wireless bandwidth for video-based feedback
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
This thesis has explored the question of how ground-based mobile robots fail in the field.
Two contributions were produced from this effort:
1. A novel taxonomy of mobile robot failures that reconciles failure classification
schemes from the dependability computing [30], human-computer interaction
(HCI) [40], and robotics [6] communities.
2. A meta-study including 44 representative examples of mobile robot field failures
drawn from 13 studies in the urban search and rescue (USAR) and military
operations in urban terrain (MOUT) domains.
The Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue (CRASAR) at the University of
South Florida provided five of the studies, and the remainder come from the US Army’s
Test and Evaluation Coordination Office (TECO) at Fort Leonard Wood. The failure
examples drawn from these studies were used to demonstrate how mobile robot failures
can be classified using the new taxonomy and the challenges associated with using robots
in field environments.
A review of related work presented in Chapter Two established that this work was
unique in three respects: it covers both human and robot failures, it is focused on robot
field failures in the USAR and MOUT domains, and it is the only meta-study that covers
mobile robot failures. It was also found that no existing approach to failure analysis is
suitable for the task of mobile robot field failure analysis.
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Chapter Three presented a new approach to mobile robot failure analysis used in
this thesis, including a novel taxonomy built on existing work. Following Laprie[30],
failures were divided into physical and human classes, with human subdivided into design
and interaction. The human-computer interaction classes of mistakes and slips [40] fell
under interaction failures. Physical failure classes were taken from Carlson and Murphy
[6]. These are effector, sensor, control system, power, and communications. The new
taxonomy was then used to explore, in Chapter Five, how mobile robots fail in the field
based on 13 studies [3] [6] [7] [8] [10] [13] [14] [34] [43] [44] [55] [59] [62] (described in
detail in Chapter Four) which examined mobile robot performance in the field. For each
class of failure, examples were provided which illustrate the nature of mobile robot field
failures which fall under that class. (Each example failure is described in detail in
Appendix B.)
This chapter provides a summary of the findings of this meta-study in Section 6.1.
This is followed by a discussion in Section 6.2 of the implications of those findings, as
well as possible solutions to the problems encountered. Section 6.3 closes with a brief
overview of future work.
6.1 Findings
How do ground-based mobile robots fail in the field? The nine overall findings listed
below answer this question based on the information found in the 13 studies covered in
this thesis. These findings cover studies from two field application domains: five in
USAR, and eight in MOUT. 28 robots were examined which represent 15 different models
from seven manufacturers, and range from small (less than 10 pounds) tracked vehicles, to
a modified M1 tank (over 60 tons). Due to differences in data collection and reporting
methods among the 13 studies, a precise quantitative summary of their experience in
terms of reliability metrics was not possible. Therefore, the mean time between failures
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and relative frequency of the classified failures were presented as estimates only. Since
these were the only studies found in the literature that describe mobile robot field failures,
these numbers represent the best answer that can be made, at this time, to the question of
how ground-based mobile robots fail in the field.
1. Robot reliability in field environments is low, mean time between failures (MTBF)
is between 6 and 24 hours.
2. Common issues across the 13 studies are the following:
(a) unstable control systems
(b) chassis and effectors designed and tested for a narrow range of environmental
conditions
(c) limited wireless communication range in urban environments
(d) insufficient wireless bandwidth for video-based feedback
3. Tracked vehicles are more prone to effector failures than their wheeled counterparts.
4. Effectors (11–50%) and the control system (31–54%) are the most common sources
of physical failures.
5. Sensor failures make up between 9% and 26% of the failures.
6. Power (6–9%) and communications (0–10%) faults were the least frequent sources
of failure.
7. Slips (63–67%) are more common than mistakes (33–38%).
8. Field-repairable failures make up two-thirds (60–65%) of the failures examined.
9. Terminal failures are more common than non-terminal with 94% of the failures
reported in TECO’s PANTHER study [13].
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As the findings state, overall robot reliability in field environments is low, between
6 and 24 hours MTBF, depending on the criteria used to determine if a failure has
occurred. Effectors and the control system are the most common sources of physical
failures across the 11 studies which reported physical failures. This result was verified
through statistical analysis in CRASAR’s follow-up reliability study [7]. Though
communications failures appear to be the least frequent, it should be noted that several of
TECO’s studies reported chronic communications problems but did not state the number
of communications failures. Therefore, the quantitative results probably underestimate the
frequency of communications failures for mobile robots used in the field. Within the
human failures branch, slips are more common than mistakes. Human design failures
were not covered in any of the 13 studies. Since the majority of physical and human
failure results came from different sources (only CRASAR’s World Trade Center (WTC)
Engineering study [34] contributed both physical and human failures), the relative
frequency of physical versus human failures cannot be determined. Field-repairable
failures make up two-thirds of the failures examined. Terminal failures are also more
common with 94% of the failures reported in the M1 PANTHER II study [13] performed
by the TECO.
The results of this meta-study support the concept, theorized in the original
reliability study [6], that maturity has a large impact on the reliability of a platform. The
results from the original reliability study [6] indicated that mature platforms are more
reliable, even in applications and environments that they were not designed for, than less
mature platforms drafted for that application alone. In addition, it appears that the
maturity of each subsystem within a robot platform also influences the overall system’s
reliability. For example, the new teleoperation system installed on the PANTHER failed
far more frequently than the platform’s effectors, which have been actively used for over
20 years as part of the US Army’s M1 tank platform. Another example is the Inuktun
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platforms which fell from 90% to 27% availability between the original and follow-up
reliability studies [6][7] due largely to upgrades in the control system, which did add
valuable features to the platform, but also added to the complexity and reduced the
reliability of that subsystem.
6.2 Discussion
Determining the underlying causes for the findings presented in Section 6.1 is beyond the
scope and expertise of this thesis. The implications of these findings for potential users in
field applications, mobile robot designers, and fault-tolerance researchers and developers
are as follows:
1. A state of the art mobile robot cannot be expected to complete an entire shift
without incident.
2. A 50% availability rate[6][7] implies that additional backup equipment must be
available for field applications.
3. The most common sources of failure in modern robotic systems are custom-built by
hand and increasingly complex (control and effector systems).
4. The most reliable components in modern robot systems are simple (power) and/or
mass-produced (sensors).
5. Most failures will interrupt the robot’s mission but require relatively minor repairs.
Potential users in field domains such as USAR and MOUT should be aware that a
state of the art mobile robot cannot be expected to complete an entire shift (12 hours for
USAR or 20 hours for the Department of Defense) without incident and robots are
expected to have a 50% availability rate [6][7]. This implies that additional backup
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equipment must be available for field applications, doubling the resources and logistics
needed to get a single robot in the field. In effect this raises the bar for mobile robot field
applications, making it more difficult for a robotic system to prove that it is in fact useful
enough to offset these costs.
Robot manufacturers should be cognizant of the fact that mobile robot technology
is suffering from the same creeping increase in complexity identified by Norman in the
computer industry [39]. To exacerbate this problem, the control and drive systems are
usually custom designed for a specific robot model, and are built by hand (this is the case
for the 15 models covered in this thesis). Quality control for a complex, custom-built
system is difficult to manage even with sufficient resources. Ultimately, manufacturers
must accept that their robots will suffer from failures in the field, and must design for
maintainability. Regular maintenance tasks should be made as painless as possible for the
end-user and any custom parts should be readily available in the event that serious failures
occur.
Based on the common issues for all the robot platforms, limited mobility [2][9]
and unreliable wireless communications are problems which need to be addressed. This
will require the attention of robot designers in both industry and research domains. Some
researchers [22] have spent years developing robot platforms with advanced mobility
capabilities like wall climbing. These solutions need to be explored and hardened as part
of a complete robot system, with sufficient payload capabilities to carry the materials the
robots need to complete their assigned task. Alternative solutions to the wireless
communication problem (for example, the use of a combination of wired and wireless
communication or repeaters to boost signal strength) have also been explored [38][11] and
need to be developed further for field applications.
Fault-tolerance systems similar to [17] and [19], which handle effector failures in
wheeled robots, need to be developed for tracked vehicles, which are more prone to this
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class of failure. Researchers in fault-tolerance should also note that complex components
are more likely to fail than simple ones. This favors model-based methods which are
better at handling this level of complexity. On the other hand, the same components are
usually custom built by hand, which means that a sufficiently precise model is likely to
apply to exactly one robot. Based on the findings of this thesis, hybrid fault-tolerance
systems which use learning [32], qualitative reasoning [60], or active probing (gathering
additional information from other sensors or robots) [31] to augment less precise models
appear to hold the most promise for field robotics applications.
6.3 Future Work
This thesis was the first of its kind, and has laid the groundwork for future studies
characterizing how mobile robots fail in field environments. This section discusses three
key avenues for such work: improved data collection methods, human-robot interaction
failures, and new methods for applying results of studies like this one to improve existing
fault-tolerance approaches.
Automated black box data collection methods, like those used on modern
airplanes, are needed for mobile robots to automatically record both usage and failure data
for future study. Due to limited communications bandwidth, operator control units often
cannot receive all of the information generated by the robot’s sensors and control system
at a given time. Therefore loggers are needed that reside in a robot’s onboard computer
and have access to vital information which a robot operator cannot readily access. As
computing resources on mobile robots are often limited, loggers need to have a minimal
computational overhead. Further, constraints on communications bandwidth and storage
require compact representations of information, and that this information be filtered for
relevance to the operator and other consumers of usage and failure data (i.e. online fault
detection and offline failure analysis modules).
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On-going research in human-robot interaction [4][63] is likely to demonstrate that
there are significant differences between it and the human-computer interaction field.
More studies are needed to explore human failures with mobile robots as part of this
effort. Reliable data collection methods which can be used for extended periods of time,
like those in place for physical failures, need to be developed and implemented. The
human branch of the failure taxonomy used in this thesis was sufficient for the limited
number (less than 20) of human failures examined here. Studies of more extensive records
of human-robot interaction failures are likely to lead to refinement of the human failure
branch, just as similar studies of physical failures [6] lead to a more detailed classification
scheme for that class of failures.
The incorporation of probability estimates, like those given in Section 6.1, is often
straightforward in fault-tolerance approaches that use probability models to detect and/or
diagnose failures (such as [25], [32], [51], and [61]). For other approaches to
fault-tolerance which do not model the state of the system explicitly and use active
diagnosis (probing for additional information from sensors and/or other robots), like [31]
and [15], the incorporation of probability data is possible but more problematic. Systems
are needed which can reliably rank failure hypothesis based on any information about the
current state of the system (gathered during the detection phase) and the likelihood of that
failure (based on the estimated probability). Such systems would reduce the cost of the
diagnosis process (which can be quite high if other robots are recruited as in [31] to assist
in hypothesis testing) by ensuring that the most likely hypotheses are checked first.
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Definitions of Reliability Related Terms
The following list of definitions covers the terminology used in this paper and is provided
as a reference.
1. availability. Probability that a system will be error free at some given point in time.
See (9).
Availability =
MTBF
MTBF + MTTR
· 100% (9)
2. autonomy. Level of supervision required by humans. A continuum from no
autonomy (teleoperated) to full-autonomy in which no supervision is needed.
3. control system. A robot subsystem that includes the onboard computer,
manufacturer provided software, and any remote operator control units (OCU).
4. effector. Any device that performs actuation and any connections related to those
components.
5. error. A state within the system which can lead to a failure.
6. failure. The inability of the robot or its support equipment to function normally.
7. fault. Anything which could cause the system to enter an error state.
8. favorable environmental conditions. Environmental conditions are considered to be
favorable if all conditions, such as dampness and light level, do not interfere with or
prevent a given repair procedure.
9. field environment. An environment which has not been modified to ensure the safety
of the robot or to enhance its performance.
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10. field-repairable failure. A failure is considered to be field-repairable if it can be
repaired under the following conditions: only the equipment that commonly
accompanies the robot into the field is available, environmental conditions are
favorable, and the only personnel available are trained operators.
11. mistakes. Human failures caused by fallacies in conscious processing.
12. MTBF. Mean Time Between Failures. See (10).
MTBF =
Number of Hours Robot Was in Use
Number of Failures (10)
13. MTTR. Mean Time to Repair. See (11).
MTTR =
Number of Hours Spent Repairing
Number of Repairs (11)
14. mobile robot. A mechanical device that can sense and interact with its environment.
15. non-field-repairable failure. A failure that is not field-repairable.
16. non-terminal failure. A failure that introduces some noticeable degradation of the
robot’s capability to perform its mission.
17. slips. Human failures caused by fallacies in unconscious processing.
18. support equipment. Equipment that is not physically part of the robot and is
required for the robot to complete its mission or task.
19. teleoperated. Manually controlled by an operator at a distance that is too great for
the operator to see what the robot is doing.[36].
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20. terminal failure. A failure that terminates the robot’s current mission.
21. UGV. Unmanned Ground Vehicle. A ground-based mechanical device that can
sense and interact with its environment.
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Example Field Failures with Classifications
This appendix provides descriptions and classifications of every example mobile robot
field failure used in this paper. Note that the level of detail provided and the accuracy of
this data is limited to the granularity and accuracy of the source material. For CRASAR’s
reliability studies [6][7] this was determined by the data collection method described in
Section 4.6. For the rest this was limited to the information provided in the studies
themselves.
For each example failure the following is provided: robot model name(s), the study
or studies that reported the failure, classification, repairability, impact, cause, symptom,
and a brief description with comments where needed. Some of the WTC Engineering
failure categories were placed in multiple classes. Each additional appearance is presented
below the first and contains only the classification, cause, and description.
Artificial lighting failure
Robot(s) MicroTracs
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class slip
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal when additional light is required
Cause energy spike in electrical system
Symptom(s) video became dark
Description The operator reconnected the robot to the OCU while the latter was still
powered. This is considered to be a slip because the operator was a
hardware specialist with enough technical knowledge to know that this
action was risky at best, but was heavily fatigued at the time.
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Bent ripper appendage
Robot(s) DEUCE
Study TECO’s DEUCE study [14]
Class mistake
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact non-terminal unless ripper appendage is required
Cause ripper is embedded in rock while robot is turning
Symptom(s) unresponsive ripper appendage
Description The operator tried to steer the robot with the rippers embedded in rock,
not realizing that this action would bend the tool.
Blown motor amplifier
Robot(s) ATRV-Jr
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6]
Class mistake
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause overtaxed the motor
Symptom(s) motor unresponsive
Description The operator attempted to use the robot push a heavy load up a hill.
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Bogged down ripper appendage
Robot(s) DEUCE
Study TECO’s DEUCE study [14]
Class effector
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact non-terminal unless ripper appendage is required
Cause used in particularly hard rock
Symptom(s) unresponsive ripper appendage
Description The ripper appendage becomes bogged down and cannot move within
the rock.
Cannot control robot remotely
Robot(s) D-7G
Study TECO’s D-7G study [3]
Class communications
Repairability field-repaired if at all
Impact terminal
Cause cannot transmit through interposed materials
Symptom(s) frequent loss of video, no signal from robot
Description The study concluded that the non-line-of-sight requirement could be met
because the equipment could not transmit through interposed materials.
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Clogged fuel filter
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class power
Repairability unspecified
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) unspecified
Description The fuel filter on one of the two tanks repeatedly clogged, requiring a
replacement roughly every six hours.
Collision
Robot(s) Urban
Study CRASAR HCFRD study [10]
Class slip
Repairability depends on damage from the collision
Impact usually non-terminal, depends on damage from the collision
Cause operators removed from robot’s operating environment
Symptom(s) usually visible through video
Description Operator caused the robot to collide with the walls while trying to navi-
gate up a flight of stairs.
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Communications dropout
Robot(s) All wireless platforms
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class communications
Repairability field-repaired if at all
Impact terminal
Cause structural steel of the WTC interfered with the wireless signal
Symptom(s) frequent loss of video, no signal from robot
Description Instead of the usual mile (or more) range of the 2 watt transmitter the
robot was carrying, communication was lost within 20 feet. The robot
was never recovered.
De-tracking
Robot(s) MicroVGTV, Urban
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6], TECO’s Urban Robot study [43]
Class effector
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause varies
Symptom(s) significant decrease in mobility
Description A track works its way off its wheels and/or guides. Common failure for
tracked platforms.
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Emergency stop switch failure
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class control system
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) switch did not stop the robot
Description Operators were taught to test the emergency switch and other key safety
features before using the robots in field tests. It was noted each time
these features did not work.
Failure of articulating arms or drive motor
Robot(s) Urban
Study TECO’s Urban Robot study [43]
Class effector
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact usually terminal
Cause dirt and other small debris get into effectors’ housing
Symptom(s) effector no longer responds
Description Open gearing for the articulated arms and the drive motor collect debris
until those components stop working.
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Gravity assist (WTC Category)
Robot(s) MicroVGTV, MicroTracs
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class mistake
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause incline of ground surface was too steep for robot to keep itself from slip-
ping
Symptom(s) tension on tether required to keep robot from slipping
Description This failure is a mistake when the operator mis-judged the vertical orien-
tation of the void.
Heat induced track failure
Robot(s) MicroVGTV
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class effector
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause temperature exceeding 122 degrees Fahrenheit
Symptom(s) significant decrease in mobility
Description The track became hot enough to expand and soften until it fell off of its
wheels. This failure could be field-repaired with a backup track.
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Insufficient automatic adjustment to lighting conditions
Robot(s) ARTS
Study TECO’s ARTS [59] study
Class sensor
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact depends on lighting conditions
Cause camera’s automatic iris did not adjust enough
Symptom(s) dark, unclear camera view
Description The iris did not adjust enough for the operator to see to maneuver the
robot.
Jammed joystick
Robot(s) Packbot
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6]
Class slip
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal if joystick is required
Cause inexperienced operator
Symptom(s) joystick unresponsive
Description The joystick was dropped in the sand by a first-time operator.
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Lighting incorrect (WTC Category)
Robot(s) MicroVGTV, MicroTracs
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class sensor
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal when a clear camera view is required
Cause failure of artificial lighting
Symptom(s) dark, unclear camera view
Description State in which sufficient light is not present.
Class mistake
Cause automatic white-balance compensation for artificial lighting
Description The operator attempted to improve the camera view by adjusting the ar-
tificial lighting, but the camcorder was automatically adjusting to com-
pensate.
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Low or un-powered
Robot(s) All platforms
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6], TECO’s M1 PANTHER II
study [13]
Class power
Repairability usually field-repaired, depends on cause and platform
Impact terminal if un-powered, impact if low depends on the platform
Cause low battery, fuel or loose battery connections
Symptom(s) no power, loose connections can be detected if power loss corresponds
with certain motions
Description A low or failing battery can cause a wide variety of problems, depending
on the characteristics of the electrical system. Dead batteries, or loose
connections will leave the robot dead. Most common power failure.
Malfunction of track mechanism
Robot(s) ARTS
Study TECO’s ARTS study [43]
Class effector
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause rocks kept track mechanism from functioning properly
Symptom(s) significant decrease in mobility
Description Rocks became stuck in track guides and sprockets.
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Malfunctioning hydraulic system
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class effector
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) smoke issuing from the tank’s modified turret
Description TECO reported that the hydraulic system failed. When this occurred
smoke was seen issuing from the tank.
Navigation errors
Robot(s) SARGE
Study TECO’s SARGE study [44]
Class mistake
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause insufficient information from remote sensors
Symptom(s) operator uncertain of the current position of the robot
Description Position and driving errors due to difficulty judging distance and position
through the teleoperation interface.
119
Appendix B (Continued)
Obscured camera view
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class sensor
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal where camera is not required
Cause lenses covered in moisture, dirt, or mud
Symptom(s) unclear or obscured camera image
Description Camera lens becomes covered in moisture, dirt, or mud. A frequently
encountered field failure, especially in wet or rainy environments.
Occasional static
Robot(s) ARTS, URBOT, Talon
Study TECO’s ARTS [59], and Urban Robot studies [43]
Class communications
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause unstable wireless connection
Symptom(s) static in video
Description Occasional static disrupted the ARTS operators. In the Urban Robot
study additional antennas were used to improve the quality of the signal,
but this failure still occurred.
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Occluded camera (WTC Category)
Robot(s) MicroVGTV, MicroTracs
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class sensor
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause obstacle or debris in front of camera
Symptom(s) occluded camera view
Description State in which the camera view is completely occluded by obstacles
Class mistake
Cause robot placed (or left) in a position where the camera view is of no use
Description The operator does not know how to navigate around (or away from) the
obstacle or debris blocking the robot’s camera view. This classification
would be used to describe additional time spent in this state after the
operator has detected the problem.
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Overtaxed power system
Robot(s) Urban
Study TECO’s Urban Robot study [43]
Class mistake
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause trying to use a frozen drive system
Symptom(s) depends on the platform
Description The operators did not realize that the drive system was frozen and would
overtax the power system attempting to get the robot to move.
Pinion gear stripped
Robot(s) MicroVGTV
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6]
Class effector
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact non-terminal where shape shifting is not required
Cause dirt and other small debris get into gear’s housing and cause premature
wear
Symptom(s) failure to shift though shift motor can be heard running
Description Pinion gear inside the geometry shifting mechanism becomes stripped.
A common failure for this model.
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Punctured track mechanism
Robot(s) MicroTracs
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class effector
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause aluminum rod lodged into the track mechanism
Symptom(s) significant decrease in mobility
Description The robot was resting on the rod until the operator tried to drive the robot.
The track mechanism pulled the rod into the thin space between the track
and the platform.
RPMs at critical level
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class control system
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) RPMs high while robot is stationary
Description The RPMs shot up for no apparent reason. One of several problems
encountered with the teleoperation system installed on the modified tank.
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Robot placed in unsafe position
Robot(s) URBOT, Talon
Study TECO’s Urban Robot study [43]
Class slip
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal in training, potentially terminal in a real scenario
Cause operators removed from robot’s operating environment
Symptom(s) robot casually placed in positions which the operator would not place
themselves
Description The operator would often drive the robot dangerously close to suspicious
objects to determine if they were mines, grenades, or another harmful
device.
Rolled on its side
Robot(s) ARTS
Study TECO’s ARTS study [59]
Class mistake
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause platform became unstable on 30% slope
Symptom(s) visible through video
Description The operator did not have a sense of the incline angle of the ground
surface, and the robot’s unstable state.
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Shear pin broken
Robot(s) MicroVGTV
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6]
Class effector
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact non-terminal where shape shifting is not required
Cause robot encounters resistance while shifting
Symptom(s) failure to shift though shift motor can be heard running
Description Shear pin inside the geometry shifting mechanism breaks. A common
failure which often occurs in confined spaces.
Spontaneous shutdown
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class control system
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) robot is shutdown
Description Shutdown when the operator tried to switch from automatic to teleoper-
ation mode on the controller. One of several problems encountered with
the teleoperation system installed on the modified tank.
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Steering lost
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class control system
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) no response to steering command
Description One of several problems encountered with the teleoperation system in-
stalled on the modified tank. Sometimes manifested in only one direction
at a time.
Steering slow to respond
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class control system
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) delay in robot’s response to steering command
Description One of several problems encountered with the teleoperation system in-
stalled on the modified tank. Sometimes manifested in only one direction
at a time.
126
Appendix B (Continued)
Stuck assist (WTC Category)
Robot(s) MicroVGTV, MicroTracs
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class mistake
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause obstacles or piles of debris keep the robot from moving
Symptom(s) tracks turning but the robot is not moving
Description The failure is a mistake when the operator lost track of or did not see the
obstacles.
Thrown track
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class effector
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) significant decrease in mobility
Description TECO reported one case in which the modified tank threw a track.
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Track slippage
Robot(s) D-7G, DEUCE
Study TECO’s D-7 [3] and DEUCE [14] studies
Class effector
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause varies
Symptom(s) treads rotating without a corresponding change in position
Description Tracks cannot maintain sufficient friction with the ground surface.
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Track slippage (WTC category)
Robot(s) MicroVGTV, MicroTracs
Study WTC Engineering study [34]
Class effector
Repairability field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause varies
Symptom(s) treads rotating without a corresponding change in position
Description Track slippage at the WTC would be an effector failure when there
should have had sufficient traction in the environmental conditions the
robot was experiencing at the time of the failure. The study did not pro-
vide enough information to determine if these conditions were ever met
or not.
Class slip
Cause robot high centered or in a less than optimal configuration
Description The operator is navigating through an area where the robot can become
high-centered (treads cannot touch the ground due to uneven terrain or
small obstacles) or has difficulty maintaining sufficient friction with the
ground surface. During this task the operator errors and leaves the robot
high-centered or uses the wrong configuration (see [34] for more details
on the impact of a MicroVGTV’s configuration on mobility).
129
Appendix B (Continued)
Transmitting over unauthorized frequencies
Robot(s) ARTS
Study TECO’s ARTS study [59]
Class communications
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact non-terminal
Cause imprecise transmitting equipment
Symptom(s) signal detected in unauthorized frequency
Description The transmitter would bleed over from authorized frequencies into unau-
thorized ones.
Uncontrolled acceleration
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class control system
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unspecified
Symptom(s) still accelerating when operator is no longer trying to steer the robot
Description One of several problems encountered with the teleoperation system in-
stalled on the modified tank.
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Unresponsive (minor)
Robot(s) MicroVGTV,Urban
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6]
Class control system
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause unknown
Symptom(s) cycling power fixes the problem
Description The robot is unresponsive or frozen and there is no obvious source of
the problem, like a dead battery or blown component. The robot begins
responding again after one or two power cycles.
Unresponsive (serious)
Robot(s) MicroVGTV
Study Follow-up CRASAR Reliability study [7]
Class control system
Repairability non-field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause overload in the electrical system on the robot or in the OCU
Symptom(s) cycling power does not fix the problem and/or small amounts of smoke
Description The robot consistently runs for a short period of time and then fails.
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Unstable camera signal
Robot(s) PANTHER
Study TECO’s M1 PANTHER II study [13]
Class sensor
Repairability depends on cause
Impact non-terminal where camera is not required
Cause bumpy terrain, sudden changes in lighting, rain
Symptom(s) unclear, intermittent, or lost signal
Description Intermittent, unclear, or lost signal from a camera.
Unstable sensor signal
Robot(s) All platforms
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6]
Class sensor
Repairability depends on cause and platform
Impact non-terminal where the sensor is not required
Cause faulty cabling, or broken or loose connections
Symptom(s) unclear or intermittent signal, loose connections can be detected if signal
dropout corresponds with certain motions
Description Intermittent, unclear, or lost signal from a sensor where the sensor itself
is functioning properly. Most common sensor failure.
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Unstable teleoperation control
Robot(s) MicroVGTV
Study Original CRASAR Reliability study [6]
Class slip
Repairability field-repaired
Impact terminal
Cause tether was not properly connected to the OCU
Symptom(s) lag in left turns and intermittent communications dropout
Description The operator that setup the system did not properly connect the tether to
the OCU.
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